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RICHARDS v. JEFFERSON COUNTY: THE
SUPREME COURT STEMS THE CRIMSON TIDE
OF RES JUDICATA
R. Jason Richards*
[Our] deep rooted historic tradition [is] that everyone
should have his own day in court.
-Justice John Paul Stevens'
I. INTRODUCTION

The United States jurisprudence is full of what were
thought to be principled exceptions to the day-in-court ideal.2
Rules of preclusion-more commonly referred to as res judicata' and collateral estoppel 4-have become commonly used
* B.A., B.A., University of Alabama at Birmingham; J.D., The John Marshall Law School. The author was one of the named plaintiffs in the class action suit of Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761 (1996), and attended
the oral argument of the case in Washington, D.C. The author thanks Professors Michael L. Closen for his support and editing assistance, and Allen R.
Kamp for suggesting the title for this article.
1. Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1765 (1996); see 18
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4449 (Supp.
1997); see also Gramatan Home Inv. Corp. v. Lopez, 386 N.E.2d 1328, 1331
(N.Y. 1979) ("One of the fundamental principles of our system of justice is that
every person is entitled a day in court....").
2. See, e.g., Jefferson County v. Richards, 662 So. 2d 1127 (Ala. 1995),
rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1761 (1996); Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n, 369 F.2d
344 (7th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 390 U.S. 459 (1968); Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant
County, 276 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960), rev'd, 365 U.S. 744 (1961); Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 211 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1954), rev'd, 349 U.S. 322
(1955); United States v. International Bldg. Co., 199 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1952),
rev'd, 345 U.S. 502 (1953); St. John v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 90
F. Supp. 347 (E.D. Wis. 1950), rev'd, 340 U.S. 411 (1951); Brown v. Felsen, 5
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 226 (Colo. 1979), rev'd, 442 U.S. 127 (1979); Hansberry v. Lee,
24 N.E.2d 37 (Ill. 1939), rev'd, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City
of Newport, 169 S.W. 700 (Ky. 1914), rev'd, 247 U.S. 464 (1918).
3. "Res judicata" literally means "the thing has been adjudicated." Barret
v. Guernsey, 652 P.2d 395, 398 (Wyo. 1982). For a more thorough discussion of
the history of res judicata, see also infra Part II. See generally ALLEN D.
VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION (1969); WARREN FREEDMAN, RES JUDICATA
AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: TOOLS FOR PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANTS (1988).

4. Collateral estoppel forecloses relitigation of issues already resolved in
prior litigation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); Thomas F. Crosby, Administrative Collateral Estoppel in California: A Critical
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mechanisms for courts to deny those not parties to litigation

from having their day-in-court.5 Courts are aided in their
"search for circumstances that justify preclusion"6 by many
commentators who also zealously advocate for broader preclusion principles.7 Such judicial and academic collaboration,
however, raises serious Constitutional concerns; namely,
whether such proactive steps are consistent with the due
process right to be heard.8
The United States Supreme Court addressed these concerns in Richards v. Jefferson County, where the Court reaffirmed its reluctance to expand nonparty preclusion to those
not a party to litigation.! In so doing, the Court chose to preserve the flexible, case-by-case method of determining
whether preclusion should attach, as set out in the seminal
case of Hansberry v. Lee.1" More specifically, the Richards
Court held that "[b]ecause [the Richards class] received neiEvaluation of People v. Sims, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 907, 909 (1989); see also infra
text accompanying notes 28-36.
5. See Dan Braveman & Richard Goldsmith, Rules of Preclusionand Challenges to Official Action: An Essay on Finality, Fairness,and Federalism,All
Gone Awry, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 599, 599 (1988).
6. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4449.
7. See, e.g., VESTAL, supra note 3, at V129; Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the
"Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 232-89
(1992); Lawrence C. George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: ParklaneHosiery and the
Collateral Class Action, 32 STAN. L. REV. 655, 659-61 (1980); Allan D. Vestal,
Res Judicata/Preclusion:Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 379-381 (1974);
Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1486 (1974);
Jack K. Morris, Comment, Nonparties and Preclusionby Judgment, the Privity
Rule Reconsidered, 56 CAL. L. REV. 1098, 1100 (1968).
8. It is important to note that the application of res judicata implicates
constitutional issues other than the Due Process Clause. See VESTAL, supra
note 3, at V429. These other issues include Article IV ("Full Faith and Credit
Clause"), Article III ("Right to Trial by Jury"), and section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment ("Equal Protection Clause"). U.S. CONST. arts. IV, III, amend.
XIV, § 1; see generally VESTAL, supra note 3, at V429-59.
9. See Bone, supra note 7, at 196 ("Courts have hesitated to expand nonparty preclusion-the preclusion of persons who were not parties to the first
lawsuit--even though current nonparty preclusion rules are narrow and formalistic, and even though they tolerate extensive relitigation at substantial
cost.").
10. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Several Supreme Court decisions
(both prior to and since the Hansberry decision) have rejected broad applications of res judicata. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322
(1979); Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313
(1971); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464 (1918). The Richards case is the most recent example of this policy. See Richards v. Jefferson
County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1765 (1996) (condemning "extreme applications" of
nonparty preclusion).
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ther notice of, nor sufficient representation in, the [prior] liti-

gation, that adjudication, as a matter of federal due process,
may not bind them .... ,,
The right to have one's day-in-court stems from the
United States Constitution, which prohibits a person from
being deprived of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 2 In the middle of this century, Justice Jackson
observed that "a chose in action is a constitutionally recognized property interest. . . ."" Speaking about the meaning

of due process, Chief Justice Stone emphasized that due
process concerns "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. " 14

Less than twenty years ago, Justice

Blackmun warned of the potential danger that the doctrine of
res judicata poses to these traditional notions: "[B]ecause res
judicata may govern grounds and defenses not previously
litigated.., it blockades unexplored paths that may lead to
truth. For the sake of repose, res judicata shields the fraud
and the cheat as well as the honest person. Therefore, it is to
be invoked only after careful inquiry." 5 In perhaps the best
modern example of the significance of the day-in-court ideal,
a unanimous Supreme Court in the author's case of Richards
v. Jefferson County recognized the extent to which courts
have relied on res judicata to deny a litigant his or her due
process right to be heard. 6 Justice Stevens wrote, "We have
long held ...that extreme applications of the doctrine of res

judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is
'fundamental in character.""'7 He also noted, "The opportu11. Richards, 116 S.Ct. at 1769.
12. U.S. CONST. arts. V, XIV; see also U.S. CONST. art IV ("Full Faith and
Credit Clause").
13. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950)); see also
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429-30 (1982) (holding that some
equitable causes of action are constitutionally protected property interests); see
generally Timothy P. Terrell, Causes of Action As Property: Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and the "Government-as-Monopolist"Theory of the Due Process
Clause, 31 EMORY L.J. 491 (1982).
14. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
15. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979).
16. Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (1996).
17. Id. at 1765 (citing Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S.
464, 475 (1918)); see also Braveman & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 599-600
("[T]here is the danger that a growing preoccupation with the need to economize judicial resources will lead to an overly zealous application of preclusion
rules . . ").
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nity to be heard is an essential requisite of due process of law
in judicial proceedings.""
Are these pronouncements to be taken at face value?
Can they be reconciled with the current trend favoring nonparty preclusion? 9 These are among the central questions
explored in the discussion that follows. This article explores
these questions in light of Richards v. Jefferson County."
The purpose of this discussion is not to suggest that res judicata is always an inappropriate means of finding nonparty
preclusion. Indeed, it is well recognized that the doctrine is
an essential part of our court system-principally as a means
of preserving scarce judicial resources.2 1 Rather, this article
simply argues that the Richards opinion represents a fine illustration of a case in which a lower court's liberal preclusion
rules could not withstand principled scrutiny.22
First, this article briefly reviews the history of the doc18. Richards, 116 S. Ct. at 1765 n.4.; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918); see also Mullane 339 U.S. at 314 ("The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.").
19. Compare William Daniel Benton, Application of Res Judicataand Collateral Estoppel to EPA Overfilling, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 199, 232
(1988) ("Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged the existence of this
trend, it has yet to adopt it and continues to use res judicata in the narrow
sense."), with William V. Lundeburg, The Opportunity to be Heardand the Doctrines of Preclusion:Federal Limits on State Law, 31 VILL. L. REV. 81 (1986)
("[Tlhe [Supreme Court] trend has been in favor of preclusion.").
20. 116 S. Ct. 1761. While working as a runner at the Birmingham, Alabama law firm of Baxley, Dillard, Dauphin & McKnight during college, the
author became aware of the Jefferson County Occupational Tax. Under this
tax, professionals who were required to pay an annual license fee from either
the state or county were exempt from paying the occupational tax. JEFFERSON
COUNTY, ALA., ORDINANCE 1120 (1987). Such "professionals" included manicurists, fortune tellers, and mule dealers. Id. Meanwhile, teachers, police officers, and judges were not considered "professionals" under the tax law. Id. Because the "professional" label under the tax's exemption scheme was considered
unfair and irrational, and because the author was subject to paying it, he, with
the assistance of the law firm in which he was working, initiated the class action suit of Richards v. Jefferson County, 662 So. 2d 1127 (1995), rev'd, 116 S.
Ct. 1761 (1996).
21. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979); see also Gramatan Home
Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 386 N.E.2d 1328, 1331 (N.Y. 1979) (noting that the
doctrine is "necessary to conserve judicial resources by discouraging redundant
litigation"). It is generally recognized that preserving judicial resources is the
most important reason for invoking res judicata. See Benton, supra note 19, at
231 ("[W]hatever the reasons cited in a specific case, conversation of judicial
resources always seems to figure prominently on the list in recent cases.").
22. It is particularly difficult to deny a litigant her right to be heard because few rights are as deeply-seated as the day-in-court ideal, and still fewer
rights are more cherished.
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This section includes a discussion of

privity, adequate representation, virtual representation, and
due process.24 Next, the paper examines the circumstances
leading up to the Richards decision.25 A detailed discussion
of the lower courts' opinions is followed by an analysis of the
Supreme Court's decision. 6 This article concludes by arguing
that the Court was justified in limiting the expansion of nonparty preclusion law and by suggesting the implications of
Richards for the future. 7

II. BRIEF HISTORY OF RES JUDICATA
The precise origin of res judicata is difficult to determine,
although it is believed that the doctrine has its roots in both
Germanic and Roman law. 8 Res judicata constitutes a traditional common law affirmative defense, 9 developed to prevent relitigation of matters already resolved. ° According to
the Supreme Court, the doctrine embraces the fundamental
principle that a "'right, question or fact distinctly put in issue
and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction ...cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the
same parties or their privies ...."' At its most basic level,
the doctrine denies those who have had one day-in-court from
seeking another. 2 In common parlance, we say an individual
"gets just one bite of the apple." Over the years the doctrine
has become synonymous with two terms: "issue preclusion"
and "claim preclusion."
Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, establishes that
once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to
its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the

See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.
28. VESTAL supra note 4, at V17-19.
29. 18 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 131.11[1] (3d ed.
1997); 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 724 n.67 (1995).
30. VESTAL, supra note 4, at V19.
31. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (quoting Southern
Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897)).
32. See Braveman & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 599 ("[I]f, as many believe,
our court systems are drowning in a rising tide of litigation, we can ill afford
any litigant who, having had one day in court, seeks a second.").
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
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issue in a subsequent suit involving the same parties.3 3 On
the other hand, res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents
parties or their privies34 from relitigating a claim that was or
could have been raised in the prior action." Thus, issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, is simply an element of the
broader notion of claim preclusion, or res judicata.3 6
33. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). Because Richards v. Jefferson
County was decided on claim preclusion grounds, this article will only briefly
touch on the issue preclusion component of res judicata. Issue preclusion imposes a so-called "estoppel" or "bar" on the issue that was actually decided in
the prior suit. VESTAL, supra note 4, at V6. For issue preclusion to apply,
three requirements must be met: (1) the issue must be the same in both cases;
(2) the party against whom preclusion is sought must have had a fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit; and (3) the issue actually litigated
must be essential to the judgment in the first case. Id.; see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
34. "Privity" has been defined as:
[A] mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property,
and if it is sought to bind one as privity by an adjudication against another with whom he is in privity, it must appear that at that time he
acquired the right, or succeeded to the title, it was then affected by the
adjudication, for if the right was acquired by him before the adjudication, then the doctrine cannot apply.
In re Richardson's Estate, 93 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Iowa 1958) (emphasis deleted).
35. See VESTAL, supra note 4, at V6; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). The phrase "cause of action" has largely been replaced
by the more modern term "claim" in the field of res judicata. The former, older
and more restrictive; the latter suggests the modern, pragmatic approach.
VESTAL, supra note 4, at V43. The change in terminology was largely due to
the difficulty in defining "cause of action," as Justice Cordozo pointed out in
United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1933), where he
said:
A "cause of action" may mean one thing for one purpose and something
different for another. It may mean one thing when and question is
whether it is good upon demurrer, and something different when there
is a question of the amendment of a pleading or application of the principle of res judicata.
Id.
36. Arthur D. Spatt, Res Judicataand CollateralEstoppel, 42 ARB. J. 61, 63
(1987). Another analysis was given by Judge Rubin of the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit:
"[C]laim preclusion," or true res judicata, treats a judgment, once rendered, as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same
parties on the same "claim" or "cause of action." When the plaintiff obtains a judgment in his favor, his claim "merges" in the judgment; he
may seek no further relief on that claim in a separate action. Conversely, when a judgment is rendered for a defendant, the plaintiffs
claim is extinguished; the judgment then acts as a "bar." Under these
rules of claim preclusion, the effect of a judgment extends to the litigation of all issues relevant to the same claim between the same parties,
whether or not raised at trial.
The second doctrine, collateral estoppel or "issue preclusion," rec-
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The elements necessary for claim preclusion or res judicata include "(1) a judgment on the merits in an earlier action; (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier
and later suit; and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in
the two suits."" Also within claim preclusion, or res judicata,
exist the concepts of "merger" and "bar." When the plaintiff
prevails, her claim is said to "merge" in the judgment, thus8
precluding her from relitigating the same cause or claim.
When the defendant prevails, that judgment serves as a "bar"
to any subsequent action brought against the defendant by
the plaintiff on that claim.39 Claim preclusion, therefore,
ognizes that suits addressed to particular claims may present issues
relevant to suits on other claims. [I]ssue preclusion bars the relitigation of issues actually adjudicated, and essential to the judgment, in a
prior litigation ....
It is insufficient for the invocation of issue preclusion that some
question of fact or law in a later suit was relevant to a prior adjudication between the parties; the contested issue must have been litigated
and necessary to the judgment earlier rendered.
Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535-36 (5th
Cir. 1978).
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court articulated the distinctions between res judicata and collateral estoppel in the historic decision of Cromwell v.
County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876), where it observed:
[T]here is a difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim
or demand, and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the
same parties upon a different claim or cause of action. In the former
case, the judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with
them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to
sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible
matter which might have been offered for that purpose.
But where the second action between the same parties is upon a
different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as
an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted,
upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.
In all cases, therefore, where is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit
upon a different cause of action, the inquiry must always be as to the
point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action, not what might have been thus litigated and determined. Only
upon such matters is the judgment conclusive in another action.
Id. at 352-53.
37. Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1982).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 (1982); see, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461, 467 n.6 (1982); Cromwell v. County
of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153
(1979).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982); see also G.
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truly protects the once-bitten apple. Regardless of the titles,
the purposes of res judicata are the same: to preserve the in-

tegrity of judicial decisions, ° bar vexatious litigation,4 avoid

inconsistent judgments," and promote judicial economy. 3
Yet, because res judicata is a common law, judge-made
doctrine based upon policy considerations, exceptions are recognized when its application will offend the ends of equity
and fairness,4" or when substantial public policy concerns exist.4 ' For example, "preclusion will not attach if the litigant
Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REV. 623, 642-45 (1988) (discussing the concepts of
.merger" and "bar"); William V. Luneberg, The Opportunity to Be
Heard and
the Doctrine of Preclusion:Federal Limits on State Law, 31 VILL. L. REV. 81,
104-19 (1986).
40. Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946); see 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4403; VESTAL, supra note 4, at V8-9; FLEMING JAMES, JR. &
GEOFFREY HAzARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.22, at 630 (3d ed. 1985).
41. Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 15354 (1979); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979); Mandarino v. Pollard, 718
F.2d 845, 849-50 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Allen D. Vestal, Extent of Claim Preclusion, 54 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 (1968) ("Claim preclusion, as established by a long
line of cases, can be a very useful concept in avoiding harassing litigation that
should not be permitted.").
42. Allen, 449 U.S. at 94; Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54; Brown, 442 U.S. at
131.
43. Moitie, 452 U.S. at 401; Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54; Brown, 442 U.S.
at 131; see also Benton, supra note 19, at 232; Shell, supra note 39, at 641; Allen D. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusionby Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MICH L. REV. 1723, 1723 n.3 (1968).
44. See, e.g., Earth First v. Block, 569 F. Supp. 415 (D. Or. 1983); Defenders
of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448 (D.D.C. 1978); see also Jay Judge, Put Lid
on Mini-Bar Litigation: 7th Circuit, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 21, 1997, at 6
(describing the doctrine of res judicata as "one of equity").
45. Edward W. Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 349
(1948). Cf. Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981), where the
Supreme Court criticized the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, explaining
that while the doctrine of res judicata should only be invoked after carefully inquiry, it is unacceptable to carve out exceptions on the grounds of "public policy" and "simple justice." Id.; Benton, supra note 19, at 232. Expressing its
disapproval, the Court said:
"Simple justice" is achieved when a complex body of law developed over
a period of years is evenhandedly applied. The doctrine of res judicata
serves vital public interests beyond any individual judge's ad hoc determination of equities in a particular case. There is simply "no principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection by a federal court of
the salutary principle of res judicata." [The] doctrine of res judicata is
not a mere matter of practice or procedure inherited from a more technical time than ours. It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, "of public policy and private peace," which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the courts ....

1998]

RICHARDS v. JEFFERSONCOUNTY

699

did not have a 'full and fair opportunity' to litigate the issue
or claim in the state forum."46 In fact, it is a prerequisite to
the application of res judicata principles that a party be provided the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" the preceding
case.47 The Supreme Court recognized this exception in Allen
v. McCurry, where it stated: "[O]ne general limitation the
Court has repeatedly recognized is that the concept of collateral estoppel cannot apply when the party against whom the
earlier decision is asserted did not have a 'full and fair oppor4
tunity' to litigate that issue in the earlier case." Notwithstanding this fact, the full and fair opportunity exception is
open to interpretation in that the doctrine has been both narrowly and broadly applied. In one such narrow case, the Supreme Court held that a prior judgment "need do no more
than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to
qualify for the full faith and credit guaranteed by federal
law."49 In another case, however, the Court explained the full
and fair opportunity exception in a much broader way, concluding that [r]edetermination of issues is warranted if there
is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of
procedures followed in prior litigation."" Thus, whether the
full and fair opportunity doctrine is applied in a narrow or
broad sense, it is a fundamental prerequisite of res judicata
that the doctrine at least be considered before res judicata attaches.
As a general rule, parties to an action may be bound by a
5
It is far more
prior judgment, while nonparties may not.
Moitie, 452 U.S. at 401-02; see also Bone, supra note 7, at 200 ("[C]ourts should

enlarge the scope of preclusion.").
46. Braveman & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 617; see also Jan Hatcher Wol-

terman, Comment, If You Do Not Succeed at First Do Not Bother Trying Again:
Should Res JudicataPrinciplesPrevent Title VII Claims That Are Unreviewed
by the State Court from Proceeding to Federal Court?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 649,

651 (1985) ("For res judicata to apply, the parties must had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter and the proceeding must have met the constitutional requirements of due process.").
47. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
48. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980).
49. Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982); see Braveman & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 617.
50. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n.4 (1979); see Braveman
& Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 617.

51. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4449; see, e.g., Sea-Land Serv. v. Gaudet,

414 U.S. 573, 593 (1974); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
U.S. 100, 110 (1969); Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 386 N.E.2d
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difficult to bind nonparties to a prior judgment because of the
due process right to be heard.52 Nevertheless, this right is
not absolute. Two generally recognized exceptions exist to
the right to be heard precept: privity and adequate representation.13 When a court finds that a nonparty fits into one of
these two categories, as has increasingly been the case,54 the
1328 (N.Y. 1979). But see Montana, 440 U.S. at 154 n.5 (finding that a nonparty may be bound to a judgment by their conduct without being "in privity").
52. See Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1765 n.4 (1996); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 803 (1985); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v.
City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918); Lopez, 386 N.E.2d at 1332; WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 1, § 4449; Benton, supra note 19, at 249. "It is a violation of
due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party nor a
privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979).
53. Benton, supra note 19, at 248. Another recognized but controversial
exception to an individual's right to be heard is the doctrine of virtual representation. See Jack L. Johnson, Due or Voodoo Process: Virtual RepresentationAs
a Justification for Preclusionof a Nonparty Claim, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1303, 1316
(1994). For a discussion of the doctrine of virtual representation, see infra Part
II.C.
54. Many commentators have noted that courts have taken an expansive
view of the doctrine of res judicata. See generally RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 3218 (1985); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note

1; Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Application of Preclusion Principles to Section 1983
DamageActions After a Successful Class Action for EquitableRelief, 17 VAL. U.
L. REV. 347 (1983); Braveman & Goldsmith, supra note 5; David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration:A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts
in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65 (1981); Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976); Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Reflections on the Substance of Finality, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 642 (1985); Geoffrey C.
Hazard Jr., Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1036 (1971); Johnson,
supra note 53; Shell, supra note 39; Hiroshi Motomura, Using Judgments As
Evidence, 71 MINN. L. REV. 979 (1986); Nina Cortell, Comment, The Expanding
Scope of the Res Judicata Bar, 54 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1976); Ann Williams,
Comment, The Expansion of Res Judicata in New York, 48 ALB. L. REV. 210
(1983). One commentator has even called the expansion of preclusion principles "dramatic." See Oscar G. Chase, Trends and Cross-Trends in Res Judicata, N.Y. L.J., May 25, 1982, at 1.
For examples of the Supreme Court's recent interest in expanding the
reach of preclusion rules, see University of Tennessee v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788
(1986); Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986); Marrese
v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985); McDonald
v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165
(1984); Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S.
394 (1981); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
State and federal district courts have similarly expanded the types of
claims precluded under the doctrine of res judicata. See, e.g., O'Brien v. City of
Syracuse, 429 N.E.2d 1158 (N.Y. 1981); In re Air Crash Disaster, 350 F. Supp.
757 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd sub nom. Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir.
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court may preclude the nonparty from litigating his claim.
A. The Doctrine of Privity
An exception to the general rule against nonparty preclusion exists where the nonparty is in privity with the party
of record."6 When such a relationship exists, preclusion principles bar the nonparty from litigating her own claim.6 Various parties fall within the circumstances described by the
concept of privity: "It includes those who are successors to a
property interest, those who control an action although not
formal parties to it, those whose interests are represented by
a party to the action, and possibly co-parties to a prior action."57 For example, privity exists where a litigant, after
having brought suit, leases his property interest to someone
else.58 In such a case, the lessee is said to be in privity with
the lessor. 9 Thus, when the lessor of the property interest
subsequently loses his lawsuit, the lessee, now in privity with
the losing party, is barred from litigating the matter again in
any suit concerning the property." This result, although
harsh, is said to be justified by the close relationship of the
parties.61 According to one court, "[C]ertain individuals may
be so closely related, their interests so closely interwoven, or
their rights so similar that it is unfair to treat them separately."62
The privity doctrine originally applied only in a limited
number of cases in which property interests were at stake,63
such as in the lessee-lessor or mortgagee-mortgagor type relationship described in the above example.' Today, however,
the privity doctrine has been expanded to include other kinds
1973); Rios v. Cessna Fin. Corp., 488 F.2d 25 (10th Cir. 1973).
55. Gramatan Home Invest. Corp. v. Lopez, 386 N.E.2d 1328, 1332 (N.Y.
1979). The privity doctrine is of ancient origin, relating back more than four
hundred years. 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 151 &
n.1 (1926).
56. GramatanHome Invest., 386 N.E.2d at 1332.
57. Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 265 N.E.2d 739, 743 (N.Y. 1970).
58. VESTAL, supra note 3, at V121.

59. Id.
60. Id. at V122.
61. Id. at V121.
62. Green v. American Broad. Co., 572 F.2d 628, 631 (8th Cir. 1978)
(quoting trial court); see Motomura, supra note 54, at 1026.
63. Johnson, supra note 53, at 1317.
64. VESTAL, supra note 3, at V122.
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of relationships, such as guardian and ward,65 corporation
and stock holders,"6 trust beneficiaries and trustee,67 decedent
and her successors, 68 and, iin community property states, husband and wife.69 Given its many, yet restricted uses, privity
has been described as "an amorphous term not susceptible to
ease of application." 70 Regardless of the means in which it is

used, the privity label may be summed up as follows: if
someone is in privity with another, she may be bound by a
judgment even though she was not a literal party to the litigation. 71 In an oft-quoted phrase, privity "is merely a word
used to say that the relationship between the one who is a
party on the record and another is close enough to include
that other within the res judicata."72 In other words, the
privity label has simply come to mean that preclusion is

65. See, e.g., New Mexico Veteran's Serv. Comm'n v. United Van Lines, Inc.,
325 F.2d 548, 550 (10th Cir. 1963); In re Campbell's Estate, 382 P.2d 920, 95051 (Haw. 1963).
66. See, e.g., Green, 572 F.2d at 630-32; Jordan v. Stuart Creamery, 137
N.W.2d 259, 263, 266 (Iowa 1965). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 59 (1982) (judgment against corporation not preclusive against
officers, shareholders, etc.).
67. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alcock, 272 F.2d 618, 622 (5th Cir. 1959).
68. See, eg., Gerrard v. Larsen, 517 F.2d 1127, 1134-35 (8th Cir. 1975);
Lesser v. Megden 328 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1964).
69. Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1008-09 (5th Cir. 1978); see VESTAL,
supra note 3, at V122-23. See, e.g., Seaman v. Bell Tel. Co., 576 F. Supp. 1458,
1460-61 (W.D. Pa. 1983), affd, 740 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1984); Zaragoso v. Craven,
202 P.2d 73, 77 (Cal. 1949). But see Glover v. McFaddin, 99 F. Supp. 385 (E.D.
Tex. 1951) (no privity among tenants in common); Acuff v. Schmit, 78 N.W.2d
480 (Iowa 1956) (no privity between husband and wife). Other courts, however,
have refused to expand the privity approach to preclusion. See, e.g., Williams
and Sons Erectors, Inc. v. South Carolina Steel Corp., 983 F.2d 1176, 1183 (2d
Cir. 1993); TRW, Inc. v. Ellipse Corp., 495 F.2d 314, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1974);
Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 670-71 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'g, In re Air Crash
Disaster, Dayton, Ohio, on March 9, 1967, 350 F. Supp. 757, 766 (S.D. Ohio
1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974); Wilson v. City of Chicago, 707 F. Supp.
379, 380 (N.D. Ill. 1989); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 471 F. Supp.
754, 757 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
70. Gramatan Home Inv. Corp. v. Lopez, 386 N.E.2d 1328, 1332 (N.Y.
1979); see also Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 265 N.E.2d 739, 743 (N.Y. 1970)
(reiterating that privity does not have a "technical and well-defined meaning");
VESTAL, supra note 3, at V121 ("Privity is a word of indefinite meaning given
through judicial construction."); Shell, supra note 39, at 647 ("The concept of
'privity' is extremely flexible under traditional res judicata doctrine .... ").
71. Benton, supra note 19, at 248; VESTAL, supra note 3, at V124; see, e.g.,
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1977).
72. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4449 n.23 (quoting Bruszewski v. United
States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950)).
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proper.7 3 Not only is it proper, it is encouraged. The doctrine
is so popular today that "[m]odern decisions search directly
for circumstances that justify preclusion."7 4 The reality of
this "privity seeking" environment is that the doctrine has
lost its intended focus, having "sacrificed bright-line clarity
for functional flexibility."7 5
Finding "flexibility" within the privity category is justified by many courts because of the need to ease the congestion of crowded judicial dockets. 6 Courts would rather
stretch the privity doctrine to unintended extremes than confront head on the deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone
is entitled to their own day-in-court.7 7 The United States Supreme Court recently conceded this fact, stating in dictum
that while there are limits on the privity exception, "the
term ... is now used to describe various relationships between litigants that would not have come within the traditional definition of that term."7 8
This phenomenon manifests itself in many of today's
courtrooms. In most of these cases, privity is found when the
relationship between the party and the nonparty is deemed
"sufficiently close" to justify preclusion. 9 Put another way, if
the nonparty's interests are believed to have been
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Johnson, supra note 53, at 1317.
76. See Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) (noting that
the use of res judicata "is even more compelling in view of today's crowded
dockets"); see also Braveman & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 599-600 ("[T]here is
the danger that a growing preoccupation with the need to economize judicial
resources will lead to an overly zealous application of preclusion rules....");
Morris, supra note 7, at 1102 (noting discouragingly that the "broader standard
of privity is evolving in response to an unarticulated desire" to advance the interests of judicial efficiency); James R. Pielemeier, Due Process Limitations on
the Application of CollateralEstoppel Against Nonparties to Prior Litigation,63
B.U. L. REV. 383, 426 (1983) ("[T]he arguments favoring expanded preclusion of
nonparties focus primarily on 'judicial efficiency.'"); Shell, supra note 39, at 626
("Courts favor ... expansion of the applicability of claim and issue preclusion
because... [of] the ever-increasing caseloads burdening the judicial system.").
77. See Johnson, supra note 53, at 1316.
78. Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1766 (1996); see also Tyus
v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 455 (8th Cir. 1996) (refusing to be "artificially
limit[ed]" by traditional notions of privity); United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc.,
627 F.2d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 1980) (proclaiming enthusiastically that courts "are
no longer bound by the rigid definitions of parties or their privies").
79. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 94-95
(5th Cir. 1977); United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc. v. Sanders, 508 So. 2d 689, 692
(Ala. 1987).
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"adequately represented" by the party in the prior action,
then the nonparty cannot bring his own lawsuit." This notion is problematic in that, at least theoretically, "[t]he
broadest conception of an adequate relationship would collapse the privity label."8
B.

The Doctrine of Adequate Representation

Just as issue and claim preclusion are components of the
broader concept of res judicata, the doctrine of adequate representation is an arm of privity. The key to binding a nonparty to an action that has been previously adjudicated
seems to be that the nonparty's "interests have been adequately represented by others who have litigated the matters
[involved] and have lost."82 The idea of adequate representation is most commonly associated with the class action lawsuit, but a class action is not its only application. 3 A party
may be bound by a prior judgment even though the prior lawsuit did not take the form of a class action if the two parties'
interests are so closely related as to be essentially the same.'
For example, in Burns v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review,8 5 a union member was barred from relitigating a claim against his employer where he had allowed
union officials to act as his agents in a prior suit against his
employer. In Burns, the plaintiff sought unemployment compensation when he was terminated by his employer after
failed union negotiations." The plaintiff argued that he was
not barred from relitigating his claim for these benefits because the prior lawsuit was a "supervisor's strike" in which
he was not considered to have been a party.87 Therefore, according to the plaintiff, his subsequent termination brought
about as a result of that union strike was involuntary and he

80. Sanders, 508 So. 2d at 692.
81. Johnson, supra note 53, at 1317. This concern is real since the privity
doctrine is recognized as having a "nonexhaustive definition." Id. Cf. VESTAL,
supra note 3, at V129 ("The interests of society and all litigants would seem to
be best served if preclusion, both claim and issue, is expanded and used to the
greatest extent constitutionally permissible.").
82. VESTAL, supra note 3, at V128.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at V126.
Id.
65 A.2d 445, 446 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945).
Id.
Id. at 446.
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was entitled to unemployment compensation.88 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed, however, finding that because the plaintiff had "voluntarily joined the union and adhered to its principles and obeyed the orders of its officials[,]"
he was bound by the outcome of the union's prior litigation
insofar as that case denied the union's claims for unemployment compensation.8 9
As with many applications of res judicata, the Burns decision may be rationalized in the name of judicial economy.90
Yet, as both courts and commentators have pointed out, the
concern for efficiency-by itself-does not substitute for denying a party an opportunity to be heard.9 ' Again, this is because the "right to be heard is at the core of procedural due
process... ,,92 As the Supreme Court has stated:
Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate all possible interests: it is intended to protect the particular interests of the person
whose possessions are about to be taken .... [T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.
Indeed one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general,
and the Due Process clause in particular, that they were
designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and effiofcacy that may characterize praiseworthy governmental
93
ficials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
9 4 the Court
For example, in Eisen v. Carlisle& Jacquelin,
held that the "prohibitively high cost" of giving individual notice to 2,500,000 class members was an insufficient reason for

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. VESTAL, supra note 3, at V128; Braveman & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at
600.
91. Cleary, supra note 45, at 348-49; Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REv. 571, 629 (1997); Robert Ziff,
Note, For One Litigant's Sole Relief. Unforeseeable Preclusion and the Second
Restatement, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 914-16 (1992); see also Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972).
92. Woolley, supra note 91, at 630; see also Richards v. Jefferson County,
116 S. Ct. 1761, 1765 n.4 ("The opportunity to be heard is an essential requisite
of due process of law in judicial proceedings."); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S.
385, 394 (1914) ("The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.").
93. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
94. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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failing to give notice in a class action.95 Although it may be
argued that this holding is limited to Rule 23 class actions,
the Court in Eisen cites as authority for this holding Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,96 a non-class action
suit. Thus, it appears that the Rules mandatory notice requirement "is designed to fulfill requirements of due process"
in whatever context.97 In sum, while the doctrine of adequate
representation may substitute for an individual's right to
have her day-in-court, its use may not be justified merely as
a means of clearing crowded judicial dockets, as claimed by
many courts and commentators.98
C. The Doctrine of Virtual Representation
Closely related to, and often used in conjunction with,
the privity component of adequate representation is the doctrine of virtual representation. Contrary to what some commentators believe, virtual representation is an established
doctrine in American jurisprudence.9 9 As properly observed
by several legal scholars, the doctrine originated in eighteenth-century England as a part of probate proceedings and
has played a role in jurisprudence ever since.' °° The only
thing new about the doctrine is its modern interpretation.'0 '
In fact, virtual representation was a rarely used concept outside of probate proceedings until the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit decided Aerojet-General v. Askew in 1975.12 In
Aerojet-General, the court used a nonparty's relationship
with the party of record as a means of attaching preclusion
principles without utilizing the words "adequate representation" to do so, thus extending the concept of virtual representation outside the probate arena. The court held that "a person may be bound by a judgment even though not a party if
one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his in-

95. Id. at 166.
96. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
97. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 173-74.
98. See supra note 6.
99. See, e.g., David Sive, Res Judicataand CollateralEstoppel in Environmental Litigation, SA85/3 ALI-ABA 1397, 1406 (1996) (describing the doctrine
of virtual representation as an "emerging doctrine").
100. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 7, at 204; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1,
§ 4457; Motomura, supra note 54, at 1029 n.260.
101. See Benton, supra note 19, at 258.
102. Aerojet-General v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1975).
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This holding is
terests as to be his virtual representative."'
into the doclife
new
breathing
(1)
with
generally credited
trine of virtual representation,' (2) giving virtual representation its modern interpretation,015 and (3) providing "the
most radical departure from traditional preclusion rules."0 6
The difficulty with the Aerojet-General holding is that it
offers no foreseeable limitation to nonparty preclusion.
Hence, this is the reason why Aerojet-General has not been
well received by other courts. 1 7 After Aerojet-General, the
Fifth Circuit began to pull back from this broad representative approach, and require a closer relationship between nonparties and parties of record."0 This retreat was first realized in Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas InternationalAirlines,
Inc.,"' where the Fifth Circuit hinted at the possible demise
of the doctrine of virtual representation altogether."0 But,
one year later, the Fifth Circuit decided Pollardv. Cockrell."'
Pollard took an intermediate approach in that it preserved
virtual representation, but substantially limited its application." ' Under Pollard, alignment of interests required "the
existence of an express or implied legal relationship in which
parties to the first suit are accountable to non-parties who
According
file a subsequent suit raising identical issues."'
to Pollard, these relationships include: "estate beneficiaries
103. Id. at 719.
104. See Bone, supra note 7, at 218.
105. See Benton, supra note 19, at 258.
106. Benton, supra note 19, at 257; see Motomura, supra note 53, at 1026-29
("The most radical departure from the rule against nonparty preclusion is found
in... 'virtual representation.'").
107. See Benton, supra note 19, at 259 (noting that the Aerojet-General
holding has not been embraced by the courts); Bone, supra note 7, at 220
(noting that courts have tended to shy away the from such a broad application
of the rule); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 4457 (1981) (describing the
doctrine as a "vague and discretionary theory"); see, e.g., Gonzales v. Banco
Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d 751, 761 (1st Cir. 1994) ("There is no black letter rule.");
Colby v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[N]o uniform
pattern has emerged from the cases."); Ethnic Employees of Library of Congress v. Boorstin, 751 F.2d 1405, 1411 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("The doctrine of virtual representation has a highly uncertain scope .... ."); Harris Trust & Sav.
Bank v. Olsen, 745 F. Supp. 503, 508 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (noting that virtual representation cases do not "explicitly set forth an analytical framework").
108. Bone, supra note 7, at 223.
109. 546 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1977).
110. Bone, supra note 7, at 223.
111. 578 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1978).
112. Bone, supra note 7, at 223.
113. Pollard,578 F.2d at 1008; see Bone, supra note 7, at 223.
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bound by administrators, presidents and stockholders by
their companies, parent corporations by their subsidiaries,
and a trust beneficiary by the trustee."".4 The intermediate
position taken by the Fifth Circuit in Pollard probably saved
the doctrine of virtual representation insofar as it is applied
in the procedural arena of res judicata. 115 But Pollard's"legal
accountability" theory has, like its predecessor AerojetGeneral, also been rejected by several jurisdictions."'
114. Pollard,578 F.2d at 1008-09.
115. See Benton, supra note 19, at 259.
116. Many courts have taken the more restrictive approach to virtual representation as predicted by Charles Wright et al., supra note 1, § 4457, where
they said that "[v]irtual representation will not soon become a broad principle
applied in many cases." Id.; see, e.g., Collins v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,
34 F.3d 172, 176-78 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that there needs to be a "preexisting
relationship;" it is simply not enough to bind a plaintiff who has the same interests as the plaintiffs in the first action, has joined them in the second action,
and is represented by the same attorney); Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 27
F.3d 751, 760-63 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that there was an identity of interest,
yet refusing to apply virtual representation where there was no showing that
the plaintiffs in the second suit had timely notice of the first action); Estate of
Brown v. Bank of Piedmont, 763 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (refusing to
hold a mortgagee bound by a prior judgment in an action against its mortgagor).
Conversely, other courts have been more accepting of the doctrine of virtual representation, as predicted by Professor Vestal. See Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion:Expansion, 47 CAL. L. REV. 357, 379-381 (1974). In his article,
Professor Vestal suggests:
Society allows a reasonable adjustment of the demands of due process.
Thus an individual apparently can be held by a prior adjudication so
long as his interests were adequately represented in the prior suit.
The concept of preclusion against a nonparty is strikingly similar to
the class suit in that if there is adequate representation of the interests of the nonparty he can be bound by the judgment in the earlier
suit. The interest of society in preventing unnecessary duplicative litigation is closely akin to the interest of society-the expedient administration of justice-which was urged for the use of the class unit.
[Ultimately, however, constitutional limits will mean] only a modest
use of this type of preclusion.
Id. at 378-81. The State of California has adopted a broad approach to virtual
representation. A representative case is NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School
District,750 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1984), where the court stated:
[The rule has been expanded to] apply the preclusive effect of a prior
judgment to nonparties whose interests were "virtually represented"
by one of the parties to the litigation ....The nonparty is bound under
the rule if he was "so far represented by others that his interests received actual and efficient protection. ..." The application of this doctrine to desegregation cases is particularly appropriate. It has been
recognized that unless subsequent generations of school children are
bound by preclusion rules from relitigating identical claims of unlawful
segregation, those claims would assume immortality.
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As a result of its limited approval and application, a
credible argument may be made that the doctrine of virtual
representation should be discarded. 117 This argument is defensible since the concepts of virtual and adequate representation are essentially identical, and the doctrine of adequate
representation is better defined and more widely applied." 8
Interestingly, the reasonableness of this argument is supported, in part, by the case law itself. For example, in
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas InternationalAirlines, Inc.,19
several individual airlines sought to use a City ordinance to
evict Southwest from a local airfield.12 ° The airline argued
that the plaintiffs were barred from pursuing their claim
based upon a prior action in which the City of Dallas had
similarly tried to enforce the same ordinance against it. 21
Because these smaller airlines had not been parties to the
City's prior suit against Southwest, the airline argued both
the privity and virtual representation exceptions to nonparty
preclusion.' The Fifth Circuit rejected outright Southwest's
virtual representation theory, noting the "confusion surrounding the doctrine." 3 In its rebuke, the court questioned
Id. at 741; see also Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 1996) (using virtual
representation to bar a city councilman from relitigating a claim over the allegedly unlawful redrawing of district lines); Eubanks v. FDIC, 977 F.2d 166, 170
(5th Cir. 1992) (binding the wife of a bankrupt husband to the order confirming
his plan of reorganization where the wife's claims "derive[d] exclusively from
claims asserted by her husband").
Related to the virtual representation doctrine in terms of the broad preclusive effect it has on nonparties is the "transactional approach" to res judicata.
See Sive, supra note 99, at 1410. Under this analysis, "once a claim is brought
to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy." O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 687, 688 (1981)
(citing Reilly v. Reid, 379 N.E.2d 172 (N.Y. 1978)). Whether it is called adequate representation, virtual representation, or transactional analysis, the effect of each of these approaches is the same: they expand the types of claims
that may be precluded under the doctrine of res judicata.
117. See Motomura, supra note 54, at 1031 (stating that "the virtual representation approach has met with the most resistance in both case law and
commentary").
118. See 47 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments § 670 (1995) (observing that "courts have
found that [the concepts] mirror each other"); Johnson, supra note 53, at 1319
(noting that "[t]he theoretical difference... between adequate and virtual representation extends no further than their spelling").
119. 546 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1977).
120. Id. at 86.
121. Id. at 94.
122. Id. at 96-97.
123. Id. at 97 n.50.
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the continued validity of the doctrine in the face of "wide and
inconsistent application.""' In the end, however, the court
fell back on the privity argument, holding that the airlines
were bound by the City's prior action because the municipality had adequately represented the airlines' interest in the
125
case.

The substantial relationship between the two doctrines
was again noted by the Fifth Circuit several years later in
Freeman v. Lester Coggins Trucking, Inc.,'26 where the court
observed:
[the] concept of "adequate representation" does not refer to
apparently competent litigation of an issue in a prior suit
by a party holding parallel interests; rather, it refers to
the concept of virtual representation, by which a nonparty
may be bound because the party to the first suit "is so
closely aligned with [the nonparty's] interests as to be his

virtual representative.'27
The Freeman court further diluted any attempt at making a
meaningful distinction between adequate and virtual
representation when it observed that the cases cited by
Southwest "[i]n support of its adequate representation"
proposition were in fact "virtual representation decisions.' 28
Therefore, it is fair to say that the difference between
adequate and virtual representation is really no difference at
all. Virtual representation is an eighteenth-century probate
"doctrine searching in vain for a twentieth century justification."12' There is just no need for it as a supplement to ade-

quate representation: both doctrines are extensions of privity
124. Id. at 97-98.
125. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 98 (5th
Cir. 1977).
126. 771 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1985).
127. Id. at 864 (quoting Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719
(5th Cir. 1975)); Johnson, supra note 53, at 1320; see also Gonzalez v. Banco
Cent. Corp., 27 F.2d 751, 762 & n.12 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Properly
viewed ...adequacy of representation is not itself a separate and inflexible requirement for engaging principles of virtual representation, although it is one
of the factors that an inquiring court should weigh in attempting to balance the
equities."); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 919, 923 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
('The principle which permits the 'privity' strand of the res judicata test to be
satisfied by adequate representation is known as the doctrine of 'virtual representation.'").
128. Freeman, 771 F.2d at 864 n.4; see Johnson, supra note 53, at 1320.
129. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALIENIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND
POLICY 631 (3d ed. 1995).
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and both invoke due process concerns. Adding unnecessary
terminology to an already adequate privity doctrine only
serves to muddy the water of the turbulent sea of res judicata. Such a distinction may be even less desirable given
that the Supreme Court has never expressly endorsed the use
of the doctrine of virtual representation as a substitute for
the more familiar notion of adequate representation.'
III. DUE PROCESS AS APPLIED TO RES JUDICATA

Regardless of whether the doctrine of virtual representation is justified, it is axiomatic that due process protection is
a vital part of the day-in-court ideal. This is because due
process guarantees are founded upon the Constitution, which
prohibits the deprivation of "life, liberty, or property without
due process of law." 3 ' This due process protection extends in
the form of a property interest to an individual's right to
As the Supreme Court made clear
bring a cause of action.'
in Richards v. Jefferson County,' "[s]tate courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the
relitigation of common issues or piecemeal resolution of disputes," but governments may not resort to "extreme applica3
tions" of preclusion to deprive a nonparty of her claim.' 1 This
130. See Benton, supra note 19, at 259. As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit recently noted:
"Virtual representation" is said by some scholars to be a useful tool for
broadening the finality of judgments and enhancing the efficient administration ofjustice. Ironically, however, its expansion increases the
burden on judges, who must apply its multi-factored balancing test to
the facts of each case. In this area of the law that must be applied frequently, "crisp rules with sharp corners" are preferable to a roundabout doctrine of opaque standards easily manipulated to reach a preferred result. . . . "Virtual representation's" intense case-by-case
analysis is particularly undesirable in circumstances where its application would replace settled, rule-like procedures.
Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prod. Co., 123 F. 3d 877, 881-82 (6th Cir. 1997).
131. U.S. CONST. arts. V, XIV. In Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), the
Court held that the constitutional validity of claim preclusion depends on
whether the party to be precluded was "afforded such notice and opportunity to
be heard as are requisite to the due process which the Constitution prescribes."
Id. at 40; see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979)
(holding that it is a "violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a
litigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard").
132. "A chose in action is a constitutionally recognized property interest."
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950).
133. Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1765 (1996).
134. Id.
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due process protection is justified as a means of ensuring
procedural fairness, as well as the appearance of fairness, in
litigation.135 These constitutional guarantees extend to res
judicata principles because "the achievement of substantial
justice ... is the measure of the fairness of the rules of res
judicata." 6 Any attempt to invoke a privity standard, however, must be tempered by the due process requirements as
set out in the landmark decision of Hansberry v. Lee. 3 7 This
means that, at a minimum, the nonparty must have "notice
and [an] opportunity to be heard."138
A. Notice in General
Notice is "an elementary and fundamental requirement
of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality."'
It can take many forms, such as posting, " ' mailing," publication," or a combination of the three.4 3 In some
135. See Johnson, supra note 53, at 1321; Woolley, supra note 91, at 596; see
also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (finding
that due process concerns "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"). For a discussion of Justice Stewart's perception of a constitutional right
to be heard, see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
136. Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313,
325 (1971); see also Purter v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 682, 691 (3d. Cir. 1985) ("Rigid
application of [res judicata] must be tempered by fairness and equity ... ");
Thompson v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 936, 940-41 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Both [issue and
claim preclusion] are qualified or rejected when their application would contravene an overriding public policy or result in manifest injustice.") (quoting Tipler
v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1971)).
137. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
138. Id. at 40. As the Supreme Court noted in Mullane, "[m]any controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause
but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation
of... property by adjudication preceded by notice and [the] opportunity for
hearing." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950); see also Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211 (1962) ("[T]he
requirement that parties be notified of proceedings affecting their legally protected interests is obviously a vital corollary to one of the most fundamental
requisites of due process-the right to be heard.").
139. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969) ("It is elementary that one is not bound by
a judgment in personam resulting from litigation in which he is not designated
as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.").
140. See, eg., Tate v. Werner, 68 F.R.D. 513 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Fowler v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1979).
141. See, eg., Milstein v. Werner, 57 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
142. See, eg., Greenfield v. Villager Indus. Inc., 483 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1973).
143. See generally 52 A.L.R. FED. 457 (1981); see, eg., Mandujano v. Basic
Vegetable Prod., Inc., 541 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1976). Of these forms of notice, the
most frequently litigated is notice by newspaper publication. Mullane, 339 U.S.
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cases, notice is deemed sufficient if it is given in a symbolic
fashion.'" This is true in representative lawsuits such as
class actions, 4 ' but notice must be given in other contexts as
well. For example, notice was required to be given in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,146 even though
4 7 Rather, it was a
Mullane was not a class action per se.

special statutory accounting proceeding authorizing the judiNeverthecial settlement of common trust fund accounts.'
less, the Supreme Court analyzed Mullane as though it was a
According to the Court,
certified class action lawsuit.4
number of small inlarge
a
"[t]his type of trust presupposes
terests. The individual interest does not stand alone but is
identical with that of a class." 5° This holding was reaffirmed
by the Court in the class action suit of Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin,' where the Court based its holding on the due
process standards of Mullane."' Thus, in order to satisfy the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the
procedure adopted should take the form of notice to nonparty members, whether certified as a class or not.
Notice is constitutional if it "is reasonably calculated to
reach interested parties, " ' 3 as well as provide them with the
opportunity to voice their concerns and objections."' A precise formula for calculating the kind of notice to be given unat 315.
144. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 836 (Supp. 1996).
145. Id.
146. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
147. Kurt A. Schwarz, Due Process and Equitable Relief in State Multistate
Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 68 TEX. L. REV. 415, 430
(1989).
148. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 308
(1950); see Schwarz, supra note 147, at 430.
149. Schwarz, supra note 147, at 430.
150. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319; see Schwarz, supra note 147, at 430.
151. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
152. See Schwarz, supra note 147, at 430.
153. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318; see Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S.
208, 211 (1962).
154. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 836 (Supp. 1996); Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 319 (1950). More specifically, "[a]n elementary and fundamental requisite of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under
all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane, 339 U.S.
at 314. Cf. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 249 (1983) ("The Constitution does
not require either a trial judge or a litigant to give special notice to nonparties
who are preemptively capable of asserting and protecting their own rights.").
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der every circumstance is impossible given that it might not
be possible to give personal notice to individuals who are unknown or missing. 5 It suffices to say:
[N]otice must be of such a nature as reasonably to convey
the required information, and it must afford a reasonable
time for those interested to make their appearance. But if
with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities for
the case these conditions are reasonably met the constitutional requirements are satisfied. 156
B. The Right to Be Heard
Many commentators believe that affording an individual
the "opportunity" to be heard is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requisite of due process.'5 7 But these commentators are wrong. As the Supreme Court made clear in the
early 1900s, "no judgment can be regarded as res judicata... unless the party could, as a matter of right, appear
and defend, even though he may have had knowledge of the
suit."'58 This means that notice must be coupled with the
right to be heard; besides, it is illogical to suggest that the
right to be heard-standing alone-could be meaningfully realized without some kind of notice that such a right exists. 159
155. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956); see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 ("[I]t has been recognized that, in the case of persons
missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile
means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights.").
156. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15.
157. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 7, at 204; Johnson, supra note 53, at 1321
n.95; Morris, supra note 7, at 1103; Stephen J. Safranek, Do ClassAction Plaintiffs Lose Their ConstitutionalRights?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 263, 281.
158. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Cooper, Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111,
131 (1912). Justice Stewart reaffirmed this holding in Fuentes v. Shevin, where
he noted:
The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is
not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose,
more particularly, is to protect his use of and possession of property
from arbitrary encroachment to minimize substantially unfair or mistaken deprivations of property ....
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972); see also Richards v. Jefferson
County, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 1765 (1996) ("[T]he right to be heard [is] ensured by
the guarantee of due process. . . ."); see generally Woolley, supra note 91,

(referring to the right to be heard).
159. See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956) ("The right
to be heard is meaningless without notice."); see also Woolley, supra note 91, at
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The right to due process is an individual right, mean
ing that the individual's dual rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard work in harmony to protect the right of inThe general rule concerning a
dividual participation.16
nonparty's due process right was outlined in Blonder-Tongue
62
Laboratoriesv. University of Illinois Foundation,' where the
Supreme Court explained:
Some litigants - those who never appeared in a prior action - may not be collaterally estopped without litigating
the issue. They have never had a chance to present their
evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing adjudiissue which stands squarely
cations of the identical
16
against their position.

1

The respect given to individual autonomy in litigation is
not merely symbolic."M It serves important functions that go
to the heart of our adversarial system. For example, without
the individual protection of due process, a nonparty would be
forced to accept "the tactical decisions, arguments, presentano control." 165
tion and mistakes of another over whom he has
Therefore, substantially more individual control over litigation is typically required before preclusion will bind nonpar"' Well established precedent dictates that persons have
ties. 66
the rights to both notice of, and an opportunity to participate
599 n.127 ("Obviously, notice is a prerequisite to the exercise of a right to be
").
heard. ...
160. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[A]ll government action based on race should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to
ensure that the personal right to equal protection has not been infringed.");
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ("The rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are by its terms, guaranteed to the individual."); McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 235 U.S. 151, 161 (1914)
("The essence of the constitutional right [guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment] is that it is a personal one."); see also Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 799, 817 (1985)
(describing the historical view that "litigation is a personal and individual enterprise").
161. Johnson, supra note 53, at 1322.
162. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
163. Id. at 329; see Johnson, supra note 53, at 1323.
164. Johnson, supra note 53, at 1323.
165. Pielemeier, supra note 76, at 420; see Johnson, supra note 53, at 1323.
166. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (holding
unconstitutional the finding of nonparty preclusion where the nonparty lacked
control in the adjudication, thus extinguishing his rights to compensation); see
also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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in, any litigation which might terminate their rights.167 As
one commentator elaborated:
Tradition has shown respect for litigant choice and autonomy in, for instance, choice of forum, trial strategy, and
settlement. Central to litigant autonomy is participation.
For the due process right to be meaningfully individual, a
litigant must have the opportunity to tell his story, to try
his case. Consistent with the traditional respect afforded
the individual litigant, the opportunity to be heard must
be more than the opportunity to intervene in another individual's suit. The Court's refusal to shape a rule of mandatory intervention out of the clay of due process has been
adamant. The opportunity to be heard encompasses more
than the opportunity to intervene, to file an amicus brief,
or to tell one's own story on the courthouse steps. Although always "appropriate to the nature of the case," the
opportunity is responsive to the need for
and the goal of
16
individual participation and autonomy. 8
In sum, the United States Constitution entitles every
litigant to her day-in-court. This important right serves vital
interests such as "values of self-determination and adversarial justice." 9 Thus, a court may not deprive a litigant of
either notice or the opportunity to be heard without possibly
also denying him his constitutionally protected rights. The
doctrine of res judicata should therefore only be invoked after
careful inquiry. 7 '
IV. BACKGROUND TO RICHARDS V. JEFFERSONCOUNTY
A. The Jefferson County OccupationalTax
In 1987, Jefferson County, Alabama adopted the Jeffer-

167. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985); see Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956). Put another way, "the right to participate necessarily implies the right to present admissible evidence and make nonfrivilous

arguments that otherwise would not be placed before the court. That right includes, of course, the right to make motions, take discovery, and participate in
the actual trial." Woolley, supra note 91, at 604.
168. Johnson, supra note 53, at 1323.
169. Id. at 1324; see also Pielemeier, supra note 76, at 422 ("[I]ndividual

autonomy and control through the adversary process are components of constitutional due process.").

170. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979).
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son County occupational tax.'7 ' The tax was passed via a
county ordinance that was based on a thirty year old state
72
statute which purportedly authorized the levy of such a tax.'
The tax requires that people working in Jefferson County
(including the City of Birmingham-Alabama's largest city)
pay one half of one percent of their gross income to the
7 3 Incounty for the benefit of working within the county.'
cluded in this privilege tax legislation are exemptions which
provide that "professionals" (as defined in the legislation)
who are required to pay license or privilege taxes to either
the state or county are exempted from paying the occupaBy way of example, "professional" manicurists
tional tax.'
and hairdressers can pay $5 to the state, and nothing to the
7
Jefferson County, and achieve complete exemption. ' Similarly, fortune tellers and crystal ball gazers avoid the tax by
paying a $40 license fee, while doctors and lawyers can avoid
the tax by purchasing a license for around $150.176 The legal
effect of this legislation is that teachers and police officers
earning salaries of $25,000 a year incur a tax of $125 annually, while "professional" mule dealers and hairdressers
a flat fee-typically in
earning salaries of $200,000 can 1pay
77
tax.
the
beat
$5-and
of
the range
B. The Bedingfield Decision
The Supreme Court of Alabama confronted, in part, the
constitutional issues presented by the Jefferson County occu78 In Bedingpational tax in Bedingfield v. Jefferson County.
field, the plaintiff was the acting director of finance to the
City of Birmingham, who sued to prevent the levy of the
tax.'79 Bedingfield sued both as an individual taxpayer and in
his official capacity as a public official for the City of Bir-

171. JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALA., ORDINANCE 1120 (1987).

172. Id.
173. See Jason Richards, Alabama County Job Tax-FairOr Foul?, DECISIVE
UTTERANCE (Chicago), Mar. 1996, at 7.

174.
175.
176.
177.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 9; see also Thomas Hargrove, Tax Squabble II -

Occupa-

tional Tax Subject to New Court Case, BIRMINGHAM POST-HERALD, Mar. 26,

1996, at D1.
178. 527 So. 2d 1270 (Ala. 1988).
179. See id. at 1270.
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mingham. 8 ' The Bedingfield challenge to the occupational
tax was consolidated for trial with another case brought by
three county taxpayers who also challenged the constitutionality of the tax.' However, it is important to note that neither case was brought on behalf of a class, nor did the plaintiffs purport to be acting on behalf of any nonparties.'
The Bedingfield case presented three specific issues for
the Alabama Supreme Court's determination: (1) whether
the Act83 that allegedly authorized the Jefferson County occupational tax manifested the requisite authority to support
the levy of the tax; (2) whether the Act was general or local
legislation insofar as it was applicable only to counties with a
population of 500,000 or more; and (3) whether the Act provided for the levying of such a tax given that there was no
express provision in the Act that authorized it.' In general,
Bedingfield challenged whether the levy of the tax was constitutional.' That is, whether it was statutorily authorized.
In finding that the county occupational tax was constitutional, the court held that: (1) the county was authorized by
statute to levy the tax based upon the "express language" of
the Act; (2) the Act authorizing the levy of the tax was general, rather than a local law, so it did not violate the state
constitutional prohibition against enacting local laws in areas
of general law jurisdiction; and (3) the Act authorizing the
levy of the tax provided also for its collection.'86 With the
benefit of this holding,87the county's occupational tax took effect three weeks later.

C. The Facts of the Richards Case
In 1992, this author and others ("Richards" or "the Richards class")'88 challenged the exemption scheme of the Jeffer180. See id.; Jefferson County v. Richards, 662 So. 2d 1127, 1128-29 (Ala.
1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1761 (1996).
181. See Bedingfield v. Jefferson County, 527 So. 2d 1270, 1270 (Ala. 1988).
182. See Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1767 (1996).
183. 1967 Ala. Acts 406, at 21-23.
184. See generally Bedingfield, 527 So. 2d at 1270.
185. Id.
186. See Jefferson County v. Richards, 662 So. 2d 1127, 1131 (Ala. 1995)
(Maddox, J., dissenting) (citing Bedingfield, 527 So. 2d at 1270)).
187. Petitioner's Brief, Richards v. Jefferson County, No. 95-386, 1996 WL
15725, at *1 (Jan. 8, 1996).
188. The Richards class represented a class of all nonfederal employees in
Jefferson County, Alabama subject to the county's occupational tax. Richards v.
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son County occupational tax. 9 The argument was twofold.
First, it was asserted that the "professional" exemption
scheme in the occupational tax violated state and federal due
process and equal protection rights in that the listed excep0
tions were arbitrary and lacked any rational legal basis.9 As
the plaintiffs contended, "This exemption scheme could not
be more irrational or arbitrary if it also exempted left handed
men with freckles and green-eyed women who refuse to eat
broccoli." 9 ' Second, the plaintiffs argued that the Bedingfield
decision should not prevent them from challenging the constitutionality of the tax because their class received neither
notice of the Bedingfield case, nor representation in Bedingfield insofar as the Bedingfield court failed to address their
9
class' federal due process and equal protection claims.
While the Bedingfield plaintiffs did allege in their complaint
that the Act "is a violation of the federal and state constitutions," neither the order of the lower court nor the Bedingfield decision made a "single reference" to the federal constitutional questions raised in Richards."' Therefore, according
to the plaintiffs in Richards, res judicata should not have
barred their class from having their day-in-court. On the
other hand, Jefferson County argued both that the exemption
scheme was rational and that the Richards class was barred
by the doctrine of res judicata from relitigating the constitutionality of the tax because their interests had been
T
"adequately represented" by the plaintiffs in Bedingfield.'
D. The State Court Decisions
In the complaint, the plaintiffs' claimed that the exemption scheme built into the occupational tax was "violative of
the equal protection clause and the Due Process Clause of the
Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (1996).
189. For a discussion of earlier case law concerning tax-based res judicata
claims, see generally Erwin N. Griswold, Res Judicatain Federal Tax Cases, 46
YALE L.J. 1320 (1937).
190. See Richards, supra note 173, at 7.
191. Petitioner's Complaint at 9; see also Micheal Brumas, High Court to
Hear Occupational Tax Case, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Mar. 24, 1996, at 17A; Thomas Hargrove, County in Legal Quandary - High Court Takes Aim at Job Tax,
BIRMINGHAM POST-HERALD, June 11, 1996, at Al (quoting Petitioner's brief).
192. See Brumas, supra note 191, at 17A.
193. See Jefferson County v. Richards, 662 So. 2d 1127, 1131 (Ala. 1995)
(Maddox, J., dissenting).
194. See id. at 1128.
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Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States."'95 Jefferson County filed a motion for summary
judgment based upon the Bedingfield decision, asserting res
judicata.196 The trial court in Jefferson County granted summary judgment in favor of the county on Richards' state law
claims, but denied summary judgment as to Richards' federal
constitutional and statutory claims, stating:
In Bedingfield v. Jefferson County, neither the trial court

nor the Alabama Supreme Court determined whether [the
Act] authorizing the tax in question, or [the ordinance]
imposing the tax in question, violates the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution by creating an
unreasonable, unjust and improper classification of citizens subject to the tax, while exempting certain citizens
from said tax in an arbitrary, irrational and unjust manner. 197
In an unusual procedural move, the Alabama Supreme Court
granted permission to appeal this denial of summary
judgment as to the federal constitutional claims directly to
the state supreme court, thus bypassing the appellate
court.

9

The Alabama Supreme Court framed the issue as follows: "Whether the trial court correctly held that the Federal
constitutional claims are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata and thus correctly denied the summary judgment on
these claims." 99 In an opinion delivered by Judge Almon, the
court first discussed the Act which authorized the levy of Jefferson County's occupational tax.00 After explaining the arguments on both sides, the court acknowledged the trial
court's basis for denying summary judgment on Richards'
federal constitutional claims-the failure of the Bedingfield
court to address Richards' federal equal protection claims.
The court then discussed res judicata. After noting that
res judicata is a "well-established principle of law," the court
outlined the elements of the doctrine: "(1) a prior judgment
195. Petitioner's Complaint at 9; Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct.
1761 (1996) (No. 92-3191).
196. Id.
197. Jefferson County v. Richards, 662 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Ala. 1995), rev'd,
116 S. Ct. 1761 (1996) (citations omitted).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See generally id.
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on the merits, (2) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) with substantial identity of the parties, and (4) with
the same cause of action presented in both suits."

21

Next, the

court recited the familiar notion that res judicata generally
bars not only all matters that were actually litigated and decided in the prior action, but also all issues that could have
been raised and adjudicated in the prior suit. 22

The court

then proceeded to consider these elements in the context of
Richards.
The court first addressed the "same cause of action" element of the doctrine by discussing the similarities between
Bedingfield and Richards."°3 In so doing, the court stated
that both the Bedingfield complaint and the case consolidated for trial with Bedingfield alleged that the Act authorizing the levy of the tax was unconstitutional insofar as it
violated the plaintiffs' "equal protection and due process provisions of the State and Federal constitutions."0 4 Moreover,
according to the court, both of these complaints asserted that
the exemptions given to "professionals" were the reasons for
these alleged constitutional violations.00
The court then compared the complaint in Richards to
that in Bedingfield, and found that the both complaints alleged the same equal protection and due process violations,0 6
and asserted the same bases for these alleged violations-i.e.
the "arbitrary and irrational character of' the tax's professional exemption scheme. 27 Thus, the court held: "The same

cause of action was presented in both actions. Both were ac201. Id. (quoting Hughes v. Allenstein, 514 So. 2d 858, 860 (Ala. 1987)).
202. Id. at 1128.
203. Jefferson County v. Richards, 662 So. 2d 1127, 1128-29 (Ala. 1995).
204. The Bedingfield complaint alleged that the Act "is a violation of the
equal protection requirements and provisions of the Federal and State Constitution," while the second complaint alleged, among other things, that the tax
"constitutes a denial of equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Id. at 1129 (quoting the Bedingfield
and Phillips complaints).
205. The Bedingfield complaint phrased the "professional" exemption scheme
as "vague and ambiguous and therefore is a violation of the due process requirements of the state and federal constitution," while the second complaint
alleged said that the Act unconstitutionally "exempts professional occupants
required by State law to be licensed but does not exempt other professional and
nonprofessional occupants." Id. (quoting the Bedingfield and Phillips complaints).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1128.
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tions for declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of the Jefferson County occupational tax. Both complaints allege violations of the equal protection and due process provisions of the State and Federal constitutions."" 8 The
court then addressed Richards' claim that the Bedingfield decision had failed to consider his class' federal constitutional
claims.0 ° At this point in the decision, the court conceded
that Bedingfield was decided by both the circuit court and the
Alabama Supreme Court solely on "State constitutional
grounds."210
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the
"Federal and State equal protection claims and due process
claims were pleaded, and it is at least true that they 'could
have been adjudicated."''
Therefore, according to the court,
it was at least arguable that these issues "were adjudicated,
because they were grounds stated as a basis for relief, and a
final judgment denying relief was affirmed."212 In support of
this statement, the court relied upon the well recognized
premise within the doctrine of res judicata that if the elements of the doctrine are present, then "any claim that was
or could have been adjudicated in the prior action is
[generally] barred from further litigation."212
Furthermore, the court addressed the remaining element
of res judicata-the "substantial identity of the parties."2"4
After defining privity broadly so as to permit a finding
premised upon virtual representation, the court held that the
taxpayers in the Bedingfield litigation "adequately represented" the interests of the Richards class.2 5 Arguably, the
court based its holding on virtual representation in that the
court found that not only were the respective interests
"closely aligned-they [were] essentially identical."2 6 The
court therefore found that this last element of res judicata
satisfied.217
Finally, the court addressed what it deemed as the
208. Id. at 1129.
209. Jefferson County v. Richards, 662 So. 2d 1127, 1129 (Ala. 1995).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1127 (quoting Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 566 So. 2d 723, 725
(Ala. 1990)).
214. Id. at 1129.
215. Jefferson County v. Richards, 662 So. 2d 1127, 1130 (Ala. 1995).
216. Id.
217. Id.
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"wisdom" of its decision. 18 In this portion of the opinion, the
court focused on the disastrous consequences that would result from allowing another challenge to the county tax, explaining that because hundreds of millions of dollars worth of
bonds had been financed based upon Bedingfield, which had
"authoritatively establish[ed]" the constitutionally of the tax,
any challenge now would "improperly interfere with the operations of the county and ...undermine the security of the
19
Thus, the
bonds, to the detriment of the bondholders."
the
where
court stated that in cases such as Bedingfield,
general public interests are no doubt paramount, the county
taxpayers may properly be considered as "the real party in
interest;" therefore, the Richards class was adequately represented to the extent required by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.22 °
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Maddox refused to follow
the majority's analysis of res judicata, arguing that the last
element of the doctrine-the same cause of action presented
"
' Judge Maddox reasoned that
in both suits-was not met.22
did the court adjudicate
decision
nowhere in the Bedingfield
222
the federal constitutional claims of the Richards class.
There is not a "single reference" in either the order of the
trial court nor in the opinion of Bedingfield court addressing
whether the Act violated the Federal Constitution, Judge
Maddox emphasized.22 3 While acknowledging that the plaintiffs in Bedingfield did allege in their complaint that the Act
was unconstitutional based upon the equal protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions, Judge Maddox
felt that merely asserting that allegation was not, strictly
speaking, "sufficient to satisfy 'the same cause of action pre-

218. Id.
219. Id. More specifically, the court's discussion concerned a pledge by Jefferson County to pay a portion of the tax proceeds of the tax to the Birmingham
Jefferson Civic Center, which had singularly issued a series of capital tax bonds
to finance its renovation on the assumption of being reimbursed by the county
in the form of occupational tax proceeds. Id. Because this bond involved hundreds of millions of dollars, the court felt that invalidating the tax now would
unjustly interfere with these bond commitments. Jefferson County v. Richards,
662 So. 2d 1127, 1130 (Ala. 1995).
220. Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1767 (1996).
221. Jefferson County v. Richards, 662 So. 2d 1127, 1131-32 (Ala. 1995)
(Maddox, J., dissenting).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1130.
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sented in both suits' element of res judicata."2 24 Judge Mad-

dox based this reasoning on the issues as set out in the trial
court and Bedingfield opinions themselves, which made no
reference to any federal equal protection violation." 5 Even if
Richards' federal equal protection claim had been presented
and decided in Bedingfield, Judge Maddox wrote, Richards'
lawsuit attacked the allegedly irrational exemption scheme
contained in the tax, an issue that was "clearly... not presented or adjudicated in Bedingfield."26
Judge Maddox also criticized the majority's finding insofar as it barred Richards' federal equal protection claim on
the ground that that claim "could" have been raised in the
Bedingfield action."' The judge dismissed the majority's reasoning on this point claiming that the evidence necessary to
prove Richards' claim, and the legal theories in support of
those claims, would differ greatly from those in Bedingfield."8
Lastly, while recognizing the policy "importance of this case"
to the county and various bondholders, Judge Maddox refused to be swayed by the majority's public policy argument.
Simply put, Judge Maddox believed that Richards' claims
were "just different from those presented in Bedingfield.""9
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider both
Richards' equal protection challenge to the tax scheme and
the challenge to the Alabama Supreme Court's finding that
the claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.3 ° After granting this petition, however, the Court entered an order dismissing the grant of review as to Richards' equal protection question and directed the parties to address at oral
argument only the issue of res judicata.23'
Justice Stevens, began the unanimous Court opinion
with a recitation of the holding of Hansberry v. Lee,"'2 decided
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Jefferson County v. Richards, 662 So. 2d 1127, 1131 (Ala. 1995)
(Maddox, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 1133.
229. Id.
230. Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1765 n.3 (1996).
231. Id.
232. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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in 1940: "II]t would violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to bind litigants to a judgment rendered in an earlier litigation to which they were not parties
23
The
and in which they were not adequately represented."
application of this rule was, according to Justice Stevens, the
4
issue before the Court in Richards."
The Court then reviewed prior Supreme Court cases
analyzing due process. In so doing, they acknowledged the
importance of allowing states to develop their own rules of
preclusion, but emphasized the Court's uniform condemnation of "extreme applications" of preclusion principles because
235 Justice
of the "fundamental" due process issues involved.
Stevens elaborated upon the importance of the due process
right to be heard in a footnote, where he stated:
The opportunity to be heard is an essential requisite of
due process of law in judicial proceedings. And as a State
may not, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, enforce a judgment against a party named in the proceedings
without a hearing or an opportunity to be heard, so it cannot, without disregarding the requirement of due process,
give a conclusive effect to a prior judgment against one
who is neither a party nor in privity with a party
236
therein.
The Court then addressed the limits on a state's power to
enforce preclusion rules, noting that a party is not "bound by
a judgment" if he has not been "designated as a party" or
"been made a party by service of process."237 Justice Stevens
wrote, "This rule is part of our 'deep- rooted historic tradition
in court.'"2 38
that everyone should have his own day
Consequently, the Court recognized that while parties of
record are bound by a prior judgment, "strangers to those
proceedings" are not.239 But, the Court addressed the well
recognized exceptions to this general rule--the doctrines of
233. Richards, 116 S. Ct. at 1764 (quoting Hansberry,311 U.S. at 37).
234. Id. at 1764.
235. Id. at 1765 (quoting Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S.

464, 570 (1918)).
236. Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 1765 n.4 (1996) (quoting
Newport, 247 U.S. at 570-571).
237. Id. at 1765-66 (quoting Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40).
238. Id. at 1766 (1997) (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-762
(1989)).
239. Id. (quoting Martin, 490 U.S. at 762 and Blonder-Tongue Lab. Inc. v.
University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971)).
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privity and adequate representation. After recognizing the
traditional applications of privity-as in guardian or trustee
type relationships, for example-the court conceded the
extent to which the doctrine of privity has been embellished
by modern courts.24 ° As noted earlier, the opinion states:
"[A]lthough there are clearly constitutional limits on the
privity exception, the term 'privity' is now used to describe
relationships between litigants that would not have come
within the traditional definition of that term." ' The Court
next discussed the doctrine of adequate representation.
Justice Stevens recognized the doctrine as one that permits a
nonparty to be bound by a judgment if his interests are
adequately represented by the party of record," ' or if other
"special remedial schemes" exist that make it possible
to
prevent successive litigation by nonparties."'
Then, the
Court focused on the grounds urged by the county for
reversal, that "petitioners were adequately represented in the
Bedingfield decision." "
The Court rejected this adequate representation argument, first addressing the lack of notice. Justice Stevens determined that the opinion of Hansberry v.Lee245 would serve
as the precedent setting opinion that the Court would follow
in deciding this due process question.2 46 In Hansberry, the
Supreme Court ruled that a suit brought against a racially
restrictive covenant was not barred by res judicata.2 4 ' The
Hansberry Court held that the property owners challenging
the suit could proceed with their case "because the interests
of those class members who had been a party to the prior litigation were in conflict with the absent members who were
the defendants in the subsequent action.
,,2"8
In his due

240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1766 (1996). Examples
include class action or representative suits, or even situations in which one, although not a literal party to the litigation, controls the litigation on behalf of
the party of record. Id.
243. For example, bankruptcy or probate proceedings may terminate certain
rights if they are "otherwise consistent with due process." Id.
244. Id.
245. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 42-44.
248. Id. at 45. For a colorful analysis of Hansberry, see generally Allen R.
Kamp, The History Behind Hansberry v. Lee, 20 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 481 (1987).
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process analysis, Justice Stevens apparently put to rest a
reading of Hansberry that left open the question of whether
"adequate representation[-standing alone-]might cure a
lack of notice."249 Citing to several Supreme Court cases, Justice Stevens stated that the failure to provide notice to the
Richards class was "troubling because ... the right to be
heard ensured by the guarantee of due process 'has little reality or worth' without notice. 5 ' The Court explained that a
proper reading of Hansberry would require that "those present are of the same class as those absent and that the litigation is so conducted as to ensure the full and fair consideraHaving established the
tion of the common issue."25 '
constitutional requisite of due process-affording nonparties
both notice and the opportunity to be heard-the Court found
that the Bedingfield plaintiffs did not provide notice to the
Richards class.252
Justice Stevens then responded to the Alabama Supreme
Court's finding that the Bedingfield plaintiffs had
"adequately represented" the interests of the Richards
class.253 First, the Court stated that the taxpayers in Bedingfield did not purport to sue on behalf of a class, adding that
their pleadings failed to assert any claim on behalf of other
county taxpayers, and the judgment they received likewise
did not assert that absent county taxpayers' interests had
been represented.2 54 Second, the fact that the plaintiff in
Bedingfield sued in both his individual and his official capacity as City director of finance did not alter the Court's
analysis.2 55 The Court reasoned that even had Bedingfield,
suing in his representative capacity, intended to represent
absent county taxpayers, he did not take care to protect the
"pecuniary interests" of the county taxpayers like those in
25 6 As a result, nothing in the Bedingfield action
Richards.
249. Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1767 (1996).
250. Id. at 1766; see Woolley, supra note 91, at 574. Hansberry v. Lee has
often been cited for the proposition that adequate representation alone may
substitute for providing notice to absent class members. See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 147, at 428-29; Bone, supra note 7, at 214; 3 HOWARD M. NEWBERG,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13.20, at 36 (2d ed. 1985).
251. Richards, 116 S. Ct. at 1767.
252. Id. at 1766.
253. Id. at 1767-68.
254. Id.
255. Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1767-68 (1996).
256. Id. at 1767.
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supported the proposition that his suit protected the interests of the Richards class to the extent set out in Hansberry.5 7 Moreover, there was no evidence that the Bedingfield plaintiffs "understood [their] suit to be on behalf of
absent county taxpayers."2 58 In sum, the Court concluded
that because the members of the Richards class were "mere
strangers" to the Bedingfield plaintiffs, their interests were
not represented such that it might be said that they had their
day-in-court. 9
Finally, the Court criticized the Alabama Supreme Court
for its reliance on public policy as a means of asserting res
judicata. 2" The Court distinguished those cases in which a
taxpayer is suing over "the alleged misuse of public funds" or
other alleged public impropriety which only indirectly affects
the taxpayer's interests, and cases in which a vested property
interest is at stake. 261' As for the former, a state has "wide
latitude" in invoking its own preclusion rules.
In the latter
case, however, "the State may not deprive individual litigants
of their own day in court."268 To do so, reasoned Justice Stevens, would deprive litigants of their "chose in action," which
has long been recognized as a protected property interest. 4
Thus, the Richards Court refused to "deviate from the traditional rule that extreme applications of state-law res judicata
principles violates the Federal Constitution."261 Justice Stevens further objected to the State court's reliance on Bedingfield as "precedent," reaffirming the Court's holding that a
litigant may not be bound to a judgment where he has not
been made a party of record.26 6 Thus, in reversing the Alabama Supreme Court, a unanimous Supreme Court held that
"because [the Richards class] received neither notice of, nor
sufficient representation in, the Bedingfield litigation, that
adjudication, as a matter of federal due process, may not bind
them and thus cannot bar them from challenging an allegedly

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 1768.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1768 (1996).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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unconstitutional deprivation of their property."267
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RICHARDS V. JEFFERSONCOUNTY
The decision in Richards affirms precedent in one important area of law, and appears to establish it in two others.
First, the Supreme Court affirms the rule that there must be
a "full and fair consideration of the common issue" before a
nonparty will be considered to have been adequately represented in a prior action.26 Moreover, the action serving as
the basis for preclusion must provide objective evidence-as
established by the parties' pleadings, the final judgment, or
the like-to support the proposition that it was brought in a
representative capacity. Second, the Court appears to hold
that federal due process of law requires that notice be given
in any action which purports to bind the interests of nonparties. Indeed, the due process right to be heard is essentially
worthless without notice that one's rights are being affected.269 Third, the Court appears to reject the long standing
belief harbored by many judges and commentators that adequate representation can cure a lack of notice. Put another
way, the Supreme Court discounts the notion that adequate
representation is the touchstone of due process. Instead, notice and adequate representation stand on similar footing,
meaning that notice must be combined with adequate representation before an absent party's due process rights may be
considered to have been adequately protected.
A. Adequate Representation in Representative Suits
The Alabama Supreme Court's contention that a person's
due process right to adequate representation may be satisfied
if his rights "could have been decided" in a prior adjudication
is condemned by the United States Supreme Court as an
"extreme application" of res judicata. In essence, the Alabama Supreme Court terminated both the state and federal
constitutional rights of the Richards class without giving a
"full and fair consideration" of Richards' federal claims.
While states are generally free to determine the substantive
law of the forum state, and in most cases the preclusive effect

267. Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1768 (1996).

268. Id.
269. Id. at 1766.
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of state judicial proceedings,27 they may not unilaterally terminate a person's federal claims on the basis that those
claims "could have" been adjudicated. The scope of an individual's federal due process right to bring a cause of action
requires more than the mere possibility of its resolution in a
prior proceeding. For adequate representation to be meaningful, the asserted "common issue" must have received a
27 '
"full and fair consideration."
This requires at a minimum
that objective evidence be present to substantiate the claim of
an adjudicated issue before a nonparty's federal claims may
be deemed to be adequately represented.
The argument rejected in Richards was the county's contention that both Bedingfield and Richards challenged the
"common issue" of the constitutionality of the occupational
tax at both the state and federal levels, as evidenced by the
references to such violations in the pleadings of both cases.
However, as mentioned above, merely asserting a constitutional challenge to the validity of a public issue is insufficient. According to the Court, (1) Bedingfield was not a certified class action, (2) the Bedingfield pleadings did not assert
any claim on behalf of absent parties, and (3) the Bedingfield
judgment did not purport to bind any absent taxpayers' interests.27 2 In short, the Bedingfield plaintiffs did not adequately represent the common interests of the Richards class,
2 72
as suggested in Hansberry.
As a result, the evidence presented in Richards on this issue was insufficient to "make up
for the fact that [Richards] neither participated in, nor had
the opportunity to participate in, the Bedingfield action."7 It
may therefore be gleaned from Richards that in actions
which purport to adjudicate an issue of public concern, there
must exist some objective evidence which establishes that
there was "the full and fair consideration of the common issue" between the parties of record and those they purport to
represent. Absent such evidence, nonparties may not be
barred from asserting their constitutionally protected rights.
The reasoning behind this result is clear. It is a fundamental

270. See Braveman & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 626.
271. Richards, 116 S. Ct. at 1767 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43
(1940)).
272. Id.
273. Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1768 (1996).
274. Id.
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prerequisite of adequate representation that the "interests"
of absent class members be fairly represented."' Without the
resolution of common interests, there can be no adequate
representation. But, adequate representation does not stand
alone. The language of the Richards opinion suggests that
notice must also be provided before a nonparty's interests
may be terminated.
B. Notice in Representative Suits
In Richards, the Supreme Court cited to Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.276 for the proposition that
failing to provide notice to absent parties in a suit "which
would conclusively resolve [one's] legal rights" is of doubtful
constitutional validity.2 7 The citation to Mullane is significant because, as mentioned previously, Mullane was not a
"class action" in the strictest sense of the term. Rather, it
was a representative action which also sought to represent
the interests of absent beneficiaries to a trust fund. Nevertheless, the Mullane decision concluded that the parties of
record could adequately represent absent parties as long as
notice reasonably calculated to inform interested parties of
the action was attempted. It is fair to say, then, that had
adequate representation been constitutionally sufficient to
satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Mullane case would not
have required notice to be given. 278 Likewise, had the Supreme Court in Richards deemed adequate representation
sufficient to meet the requirements of due process, they
would not have premised their holding in part on the failure
to provide notice. Thus, a class action does not appear to be a
prerequisite to providing notice. Indeed, it may be derived
from Richards that notice is required in any action which
purports to represent the interests of nonparties.
Furthermore, by citing Mullane in the opinion, the Supreme Court seems to establish the minimum standard that
will satisfy the due process notice requirement in representative suits. That is, notice must be reasonably calculated to
reach all interested nonparties, notwithstanding the financial

275.
276.
277.
278.

Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 41-42; see Woolley, supra note 91, at 575.
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1767 (1996).
Woolley, supra note 91, at 583.
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burden of doing So.279 Requiring notice in such situations appears to satisfy the Court's concern for both fairness and the
appearance of fairness, a characteristic deeply-rooted in our
notions of due process and democracy. 80 The concern for procedural fairness was similarly stressed by Justice Breyer at
oral argument, who said: "tak[ing] a person's action away
from him without notice ...would seem (a) very unfair, and

(b) contrary to the precedents of the [Supreme] Court...."'
This comment may be supplemented by other commentators'
perceptions of judicial fairness. For example, Professor
Woolley believes:
By requiring the judicial system to act in a way that appears fair, the Due Process Clause insures that reasonable
people feel that the judicial system is fair. In my view, a

concern for fairness and the appearance intuitively leads
to the conclusion that "everyone should have his own day
in court." We need not simply rely on intuition, however.
Social science research on legal procedure supports the
view that providing individuals an opportunity to present
evidence and make arguments has a significant impact on
a litigant's perception that the process is fair, quite distinct from the objective accuracy of the result. In short,
while permitting litigants to participate reduces the risk of
error in the aggregate to an28acceptable
level, participation
2
also has independent value.
Similarly, Judge Newman advocates a broader definition of
fairness in the courts-one that embraces fairness in
individual actions but also to all those who wish to
participate in the judicial system and to all who are subject
to its findings. 83 He suggests that the costs and delays
associated with the unflattering aspects of our judicial
system is directly associated with a narrow concept of

279. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 166 (1974) (finding that
notice must be provided to absent class members notwithstanding the
"prohibitively high cost" imposed).
280. See Woolley, supra note 91, at 596; see also Jon Newman, Rethinking
Fairness:Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1646 (1985)
("Fairness is the fundamental concept that guides our thinking about substantive
and procedural law.").
281. United States Supreme Court, Remarks at Oral Argument of Richards
v. Jefferson County, No. 95-386, 1996 WL 146314, at *32-*33 (Mar. 26, 1996)
[hereinafter Oral Argument].
282. Woolley, supra note 91, at 596.
283. See Newman, supra note 280, at 1643-44.
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fairness.2" As a result, Judge Newman urges a broader
approach to fairness:
First, we must learn to evaluate the fairness of each step
in the litigation process not only in the narrow context of
its own discrete contribution to the result, but in the
broader context of its incremental value in promoting fairness compared to the inevitable risks of an unfair outcome. Second, we must include in our assessment of fairness not only fairness of result in the dispute at hand, but
fairness in the broader context for all who use and wish to
use the litigation process. Third, we must think about
fairness of result not only in the familiar context of losses
compensable within the legal framework, but in the
that occur across the
broader context of all similar losses
285
whole spectrum of human activity.
The Richards opinion's "strict application of preclusion rules
is undoubtedly consistent with Judge Newman's broader
vision of fairness."28 6 Thus, procedural fairness can no longer

be discounted as an inconsequential aspect of our judicial
system. No longer can the concerns for judicial efficiency
alone justify "extreme applications" of preclusion principles.
In Richards, the Supreme Court changed the way in which
the game of procedural due process is played.
First, notice must now be provided in any suit which purports to terminate the legal rights of others. This would
seemingly require that notice be provided where it is not explicitly mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 23 generally requires that notice be given to absent
class members so that they may have the opportunity to either opt out of or participate in the resolution of their rights.
The right of an absent class member to participate in such
actions stems from the opportunity to be heard, which includes the opportunity to make motions, join in discovery, as
well as participate in the actual proceeding of his case.287
Ironically, however, the right to participate does not include
the right to notice in Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) class actions.
Thus, at least theoretically, in a Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) representative suit, the plaintiffs may represent the interests of
284. See Newman, supra note 280, at 1644; see also Braveman & Goldsmith,
supra note 5, at 616.
285. Newman, supra note 280, at 1647.
286. Braveman & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 616.
287. See Woolley, supra note 91, at 604.
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nonparties in court but not provide them with any notice of
that representation and yet this procedure will pass constitutional muster. At the same time, however, Rule 23 provides
in subdivision (c)(3) that the "judgment in ...a class action
under subdivision... (b)(2)... shall include and describe
those whom the court finds to be members of the class."288 As
one commentator put it: "Because the drafters of Rule 23 assumed that due process does not require notice and an opportunity to be heard in [Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) suits], it is unclear how those suits should be treated."2 89 Nevertheless, two
general philosophies prevail:
Subdivision (c)(3)... can be read consistently with the due
process clause in two radically different ways. One reading would honor the rule's intent not to require notice in
(b)(2) suits. This reading would treat subdivision (c)(3) as
simply providing that a class judgment includes a class
member when the requirements of due process have been
met. Because Rule 23 does not require notice in (b)(1) or
(b)(2) suits, subdivision (c)(3) would be read to include in a
class judgment only those who have received notice or can
otherwise be bound.
An alternative reading of subdivision (c)(3) would view
the subdivision as directing a court to exercise its authority to ensure that class members are bound by a class
judgment. Because subdivision (d)(2) authorizes the court
to exercise its discretion to order notice "for the protection
of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action," subdivision (c)(3) could be read to require that class members in a (b)(2) suit be given the best
notice reasonably practicable. °
This debate was addressed at oral argument in Richards,
where the county argued the former of these two positions.
The county characterized the Bedingfield suit as a (b)(2) class
action insofar as the Bedingfield plaintiffs represented
absent taxpayers on the public issue of the constitutionality
of the occupational tax. According to the county, then, the
Bedingfield plaintiffs were not technically required to give
notice under the Federal Rules.
While this argument may have been technically accurate,

288. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3); see Woolley, supra note 91, at 600.
289. Woolley, supra note 91, at 600.
290. Id. at 600-0 1.
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it did not seem to square with the Supreme Court's notion of
fairness. Indeed, at oral argument, Justice Breyer asked:
What I want to know is, I couldn't find any authority that
explained to me why there is not notice in (b)(2), why
there shouldn't be notice, how those class actions work, or
what conceivable thing was going through the rulemaker's
mind in not saying you should have notice, given the
precedent in the Supreme Court that you can't take a per291
son's action away from them without notice.
After the attorney for Jefferson County had elaborated on the
historical basis for the failure of rulemakers to provide notice
in such cases, Justice Ginsburg, clearly frustrated, stated:
[T]hat's not quite right, is it? There isn't mandatory notice
because there is such a variety of cases that come under
(b)(1) and (b)(2), but look at (d)(3), which instructs the
court to require for the protection of the members of the
class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action that
notice be given in such a manner as the court may direct.
I assume from that provision that in a case comparable to
the Mullane situation a district court... would say
... you have to give notice. 11
From these exchanges in the courtroom, it seemed obvious
that the Court was simply uncomfortable with the notion of
terminating a person's constitutionally protected right to
bring a cause of action without providing him with notice of
some kind that his rights were being extinguished.
Nevertheless, the Court in the Richards opinion failed to
address the specific question of whether notice was required
under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) class actions. The issue was
avoided because there was no objective evidence present
which supported the county's claim that Bedingfield was in
Had
fact a representative (b)(1) or (b)(2) class action.
likely
it
is
however,
a
claim,
evidence existed to validate such
291. Oral Argument, supra note 281, at *31-*32.
292. Id. at *33-*34. Rule 23(d), to which the Court was referring, reads in
relevant part as follows:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the protection of
the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action,
that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or
all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent
of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and
present their claims and defenses, or otherwise to come into the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
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that the Court would still have required some notice be
provided to absent class members. To justify this position,
one need look no further than the Court's reference to
Mullane at both oral argument and in its opinion for the
proposition that notice be provided in any action which
purports to terminate another's "chose in action." In reality,
if the Court required, as it did in Richards, that a non-class
action representative suit must provide notice to nonparties
to whom their action asserts to bind, why would the Court
not require that the same notice be applied in Rule 23(b)(1)
and (b)(2) class actions, where the action is brought in an
officially recognized representative capacity and likewise
purports to bind nonparties to the outcome of the
adjudication. This is especially true given that at least some
members of the Court seemed willing to read a notice
requirement into Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions. As a
result, it appears to be the case that courts should require
notice to be given in any kind of representative action, even
though such notice may not specifically be mandated by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
C. Notice andAdequate Representation: A Cumulative
Requirement
The principle import of Richards is that the Supreme
Court appeared to unanimously reject the reading of Hansberry which left open the possibility that adequate representation alone might satisfy the constitutional requirements of
due process. 293 First, the Court expressed doubt that Hans-

berry had left open such a proposition."' Even assuming it
had, however, the Court found it "troubling" that one's due
process right to be heard could be terminated without "any
notice that a suit was pending which would conclusively resolve [her] legal rights."295 Indeed, quoting Mullane, the
Court stated that "the right to be heard ensured by the guarantee of due process 'has little reality or worth unless one is'
provided notice.2 9

This reading of Hansberry-that notice

and adequate representation are interlocking-formed the
293. See Woolley, supra note 91, at 573-74.
294. See Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 1767 (1996); Woolley,
supra note 91, at 574.
295. Richards, 116 S. Ct. at 1766.
296. Id.
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basis of the Court's holding in Richards. "Because [the Richards class] received neither notice of, nor sufficient representation in, the Bedingfield litigation, that adjudication, as a
matter of federal due process, may not bind them ...."'
The key point is that courts may no longer assume that adequate representation may substitute for the failure to provide
notice to nonparties whose interests are vulnerable to preclusion. Rather, it now appears to be the law that notice must
be combined with adequate representation before any proceeding will work to preclude nonparties whose constitutionally protected rights are at stake. At least one commentator
298 The rationale
has agreed with this reading of Richards.
behind this result is commonsensical. It is unrealistic and,
consequently, inherently unfair, to extinguish one's constitutionally protected rights without providing notice that one's
rights are being lost. This is not a revolutionary notion, however. It has been supported by courts and commentators for
a very long time."' It is therefore difficult to understand how
some judges and commentators have blindly proclaimed that
adequate representation alone was the touchstone of due
process. 00 Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that
the Richards holding does not appear to limit the cumulative
requirements of notice and adequate representation to certified class action lawsuits. Following the Mullane rationale,
the Court appears to hold that in any representative action
which purports to bind the interests of nonparties, notice and
adequate representation must be provided. This argument is
bolstered by the fact that the Court held that Bedingfield was
not a class action lawsuit (even in the obscure Rule 23(b)(1)
297. Id. at 1769.
298. See Woolley, supra note 91, at 574-75.
299. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Moreover, as one leading
commentator has explained:
[I]t is self-evident that a full opportunity to be heard is an essential
element of res judicata, i.e., the risk of unfairness must be overcome if
claim preclusion or cause of action preclusion is to be allowed. Where
the opportunity to litigate was not complete and unfettered, the court
should not grant preclusion because fundamental unfairness is existent.
FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 17.
300. It appears that courts and commentators have latched onto the dictum
in Hansberry v.Lee for relying upon such a proposition. For an excellent dis-

cussion of why this reliance is inherently incorrect, see Woolley, supra note 91,
at 574-76.
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or (b)(2) context), but nevertheless reversed the Alabama Supreme court on the basis that Bedingfield failed to provide either notice or sufficient representation to absent parties.
This appears to be the rule regardless of whether the plaintiffs' interests are "identical" to those absent parties they
claim to represent, 1 or a less substantial relationship exists.0 2
VII. CONCLUSION

As of this writing, Richards v. Jefferson County has been
cited by no fewer than fourteen state and federal courts."'
Although the vast majority of these cases have cited to Richards approvingly for the day-in-court ideal as well as for the
proposition that notice must be combined with the opportunity to be heard, one aberration exists. In Tyus v. Schoemehl, °4 the court applied preclusion on the basis that the
plaintiff had been sufficiently represented, without directly
addressing the issue of notice. Rather, the Tyus court used
the doctrine of virtual representation to bar a city councilman
from relitigating the allegedly unlawful redrawing of district
lines to weaken the vote of African-Americans. While paying
lip service to the notion that everyone is entitled to their
"day-in-court," the court used the novel approach of addressing the specific facts of the case so that it would not be
"artificially limited" by the day-in-court ideal. °6 In its analysis, the Tyus court failed to address the complete holding of
301. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319.
302. See Jefferson County v. Richards, 662 So. 2d 1127, 1132 (Ala. 1995),
rev'd, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (1996) (Maddox, J., dissenting) (stating Richard's claims
were "just different from those presented in Bedingfield").
303. See Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prod. Co., 123 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 1997); Tourangeau v. Uniroyal, 101 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 1996); Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d
1287 (9th Cir. 1996); Ahng v. Allsteel, Inc., 96 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 1996); Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting); Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 1996); Pilot Trading
Co. v. Hartford Ins. Group, 946 F. Supp. 834 (D. Nev. 1996); Romstadt v. Apple
Computer, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 701 (N.D. Ohio 1996); Braun v. State, 937 P.2d
505 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997); Romero v. Star Markets, Ltd., 922 P.2d 1018
(Haw. Ct. App. 1996); Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 131 F.3d 580, 589 (6th
Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 96-1673, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2051, at *1 (6th Cir.
Feb. 12, 1998); Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (Fletcher, J., dissenting in part); Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1997); In matter
of Schultz, 660 N.Y.S.2d 155 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
304. 93 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 1996).
305. Id. at 455.
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Richards, which reversed the Alabama Supreme Court because the prior action had failed to provide "notice of, nor sufficient representation in," the prior litigation. 6 Instead, the
Tyus court focused solely on the dictum of the Supreme
Court's decision in Richards, which addressed the fact that
the scope of privity has been expanded to include relationships that were not originally associated with the term.3 7 In
advocating a broader approach to virtual representation, the
circuit court cited the need for judicial economy three
times."0 8 As discussed earlier in this article, however, the
concern for judicial efficiency-without more-is an insufficient reason for invoking nonparty preclusion. As the Supreme Court has stated, "Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate all possible
recognizes values greater
interests ....[T]he Constitution
30 9
than speed and efficiency."

Moreover, the Tyus court tacitly rejected Richards insofar as the Supreme Court found that there must be a "full
and fair consideration of the common issue. 31° In so doing,

the Tyus court proclaimed that it did not agree that "absent
an effective and diligent prosecution of the case at the first
trial, virtual representation is inapplicable.""' Rather, the
court believed that "adequate representation is best viewed
in terms of incentive to litigate."31 2

"No more is required,"

court.313

This pronouncement flies in the face of the
said the
Court's holding in Richards. In a concurring opinion, Senior
Circuit Judge Henley correctly pointed out that the mere
"incentive" to raise the same issues does not "appear" to satisfy the sufficient representation test of Richards, which
mandates that there be a "full and fair consideration of the
common issue."3

4

Nevertheless, Judge Henley concurred in

the judgment because he felt that the requirements of notice
306. Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 1767 (1996).
307. "[Although there are clearly constitutional limits on the privity exception, the term 'privity' is now used to describe relationships between litigants
that would not have come within the traditional definition of that term." Id. at
1766.
308. Id.
309. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
310. Id.
311. Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 458 (8th Cir. 1996).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 459 (Henley, J., concurring).
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and adequate representation had been met for other reasons.3 11 Upon appeal, the United States Supreme Court de-

nied certiorari. 16 It is difficult to speculate why the Supreme
Court denied review, even for the limited purpose of issuing a
summary opinion with a single citation to Richards. Critics
would likely argue, however, that the Court denied certiorari
because it is inundated with petitions from cases like Richards which are inconsistent with the purpose for which res
judicata was intended, namely, the conservation of scarce judicial resources. Although, it is more likely that review was
denied simply because the facts of Tyus lended itself to a just
result notwithstanding the obvious "misgivings" associated
with the court's language, as pointed out by Judge Henley in
his concurrence." 7 Nevertheless, it should not be surprising
that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit would disfavor the Richards opinion, given that the judges of that court
advocate a "liberal" interpretation of the doctrine of virtual
representation.3 " However, not only is the Tyus court's use of
the term "virtual representation" inconsistent with that of
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation, 31 9 but the

circuit court's reasoning is wholly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Richards, which condemns "extreme
applications" of res judicata.
By contrast, a proper reading of Richards was noted by
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hiser v. Frank315. According to Judge Henley, the notice requirement of due process was
met because some of the plaintiffs in the second action had been plaintiffs in
the prior suit. Id. Moreover, both proceedings were litigated by the same lawyer. Id. As a result, Judge Henley believed that the "sufficient representation"
aspect of due process had been met. Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 459 (8th
Cir. 1996).
316. Miller v. Schoemehl, 117 S. Ct. 1427 (1997); Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d
449 (8th Cir. 1996).
317. "Not withstanding [the] misgivings about the proposition of 'virtual representation' preclusion in general and some of the language of the panel's opinion, I believe that on the facts here, the requirements of 'notice' and 'sufficient
representation' were satisfied." Tyus, 93 F.3d at 459 (Henley, J., concurring).
318. Id. at 455. The "liberal use [of virtual representation] better accommodates the competing considerations of judicial economy and due process." Id.
But see Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prod. Co., 123 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting
that the expansion of the doctrine of virtual representation actually "increases
the burden on judges, who must apply its multi-factored balancing test to the
facts of each case").
319. Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 1996). To date, the Supreme
Court of the United States has never endorsed the use of the term "virtual representation" in an opinion addressing res judicata.
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lin,32 which, citing to Richards, found that while common

concerns were raised in both the prior and current litigation,
those concerns "were not given the careful consideration they
deserve[d]." " ' Therefore, according to that court, "it would be
32
unjust to block future consideration [of the issue] now."
Another principle feature of Richards is the requirement
that notice comply at a minimum with the Mullane standard.
The Hawaii Supreme Court seemed to accept this reading of
Richards in Romero v. Star Markets, Ltd.,323 where the court
cited Mullane for the proposition that notice must be reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the action.324 The Romero court also cited Richards for the requirement that notice and the opportunity to be heard are
interlocking requirements.325 In so reasoning, the court refused to bind absent parties who were "affected by a judgment" in an ex parte proceeding in which they were "without
notice and an opportunity to be heard."2 6 Quoting Richards,
the court stated that it is part of our "deep-rooted historic
tradition that everyone should have his or her day in
32 7

court."

Other courts have similarly cited Richards for the proposition that notice and the opportunity to be heard are cumulative requirements, noting that "notice is an important element of due process, " "' and that it would be "unjust" to
deprive a person of her "day-in- court."329 Even in those cases

in which preclusion did attach, however, both notice and ade320. 94 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 1996).
321. Id. at 1293 (quoting Ferguson v. Department of Corrections, 816 P.2d
134, 139 (Alaska 1991)).
322. Id.; see also Ahng v. Allsteel, Inc., 96 F.3d 1033, 1037 (7th Cir. 1996)
(citing Richards in an opinion which reversed a lower court's finding of virtual
representation where there was "no need to press the point" at issue in the
prior litigation).
323. 922 P.2d 1018 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1020-22.
327. Id. at 1025-26 (quoting Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761,
1765-66 (1996)).
328. Pilot Trading Co. v. Hartford Ins. Group, 946 F. Supp. 834, 839 (D. Nev.
1996).
329. See Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1293 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Ahng
v. Allsteel, Inc., 96 F.3d 1033, 1037 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that persons "are
entitled to their own day in court"); Romstadt v. Apple Computer, Inc., 948 F.
Supp. 701, 710 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (stating that the class would be
"disadvantaged and prejudiced" if barred from bringing suit).
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quate representation were, with the exception already noted,
required to have been present.3"' As the case law amply demonstrates, the jurisdictions which have cited to Richards best
illustrate the correct application of preclusion principles and
the significance of the day-in-court ideal.
The United States Supreme Court long ago observed that
"res judicata renders white that which is black, straight that
which is crooked."3 1 This conundrum suggests that in applying the doctrine, the interests of individual litigants in
adjudicating their own claims, and indeed society's concerns
for procedural fairness in general, plays second fiddle to the
Court's overriding concern for truth.3
At the same time,
however, the Supreme Court has also recognized that a
"redetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to
doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures
followed in prior litigation."33 3 Thus, the quagmire that exists
for the judicial system is how to balance the competing interests of finality and certainty against society's concerns for
justice and fairness. 4 Truth and justice is a subjective notion; it is intimately personal. As one commentator put it,
"The process of litigation is a product of the mind."335 Although public perception of truth is a relative concept, it no
doubt fosters in each of us the feeling "that justice has been
done."33 As Justice Frankfurter observed:
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at
truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and the opportunity to meet it.
Nor has a better way been found for generating the feeling
so important to a popular government, that justice has
been done. 37
330. See generally Tourangeau v. Uniroyal, Inc., 101 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 1996).
331. Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 352, 364 (1859).
332. Morris, supra note 7, at 1100.
333. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n.11 (1979). But see Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) (noting that justice
is achieved "when a complex body of law developed over a period of years is
evenhandedly applied").
334. Morris, supra note 7, at 1100. See generally Michael L. Closen & Robert
G. Johnston, Civil Procedure in the Seventh Circuit:A Harmonious Balance of
Competing Interests, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97, 98 (1981) (discussing Seventh
Circuit cases that "[flor the most part,... show a pragmatic but sensitive balancing of competing interests between individuals and government").
335. Newman, supra note 280, at 1659.
336. Pielemeier, supra note 76, at 428.
337. Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)
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With the sense of justice in the foreground, it is now time

38
for courts to rethink their notions of fairness. The Richards
case appears to be an example of such rethinking. In Richards, the Supreme Court appeared to reevaluate its conception of fairness, condemning on more than one occasion the
"extreme applications" of res judicata. It seems that the Supreme Court recognized in Richards something that Justice
Holmes observed a very long time ago: "[E]ven a dog distin3 39
guishes between being stumbled over and being kicked."

(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Pielemeier, supra note 76, at 428.
338. See generally Newman, supra note 280.
339. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 3 (1881).

